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Abstract 
The history of the Church’s participation in, and attitudes towards, warfare have been 
well-documented in several fields of research. The development of the doctrine of just war 
and the medieval crusades within Western Christianity, have been the subject of a 
considerable amount of scholarship. There has also recently been an increasing amount of 
research done by historians, theologians and political theorists comparing the status of 
warfare within the Christian and Islamic traditions. However, the current state of the 
historiography is focused almost entirely on Western Christianity, and does not address in 
any depth the attitudes toward warfare present in Eastern Christianity within the Byzantine 
Empire in the Middle Ages.   
This thesis seeks to address this historiographical imbalance by comparing the 
development of the Eastern and Western Church’s positions on warfare throughout the 
medieval period. The thesis examines the factors that led to the divergence of the two 
Churches’ attitudes towards warfare, and the development and impact of their differing 
theologies during the medieval period. It is argued that the fundamental point of divergence 
between the Eastern and Western Church’s attitude to warfare is linguistic and theological in 
nature. The linguistic differences between the Greek and Latin Churches, led to different 
theological interpretive frameworks regarding the subject of warfare. These different 
fundamental theological assumptions would lead the two Churches down different 
developmental paths and would prevent the development or acceptance of Western theories 
of just war and holy war in the Eastern Church.  
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A Note on Biblical Translations 
Throughout this thesis, particularly in the first chapter, I have included a number of 
biblical citations, which are related to the subject of warfare, many of which were directly 
referenced by Church Fathers such as St Augustine in their discussions of the topic. To more 
accurately reflect the biblical texts that would have been prevalent in late antiquity and the 
medieval period, I have used two different English translations. 
For Old Testament references, I have used the Douay-Rheims translation of St 
Jerome’s Latin Vulgate.1 This translation is the closest English approximation of the 
language of the Vulgate, the version of the Bible most common in medieval Europe from the 
fifth century. For the New Testament however, I have used a different translation. Although 
ideally I would have again liked to have used the Douay-Rheims text prepared by Edgar and 
Kinney, their edition of the New Testament is, at the time of writing, not yet available. For 
this reason, I have relied upon the King James Version of the Bible for my New Testament 
references.
2
 While the New Testament of the King James Version was itself translated from 
the original Greek, its translators made use of secondary Latin sources and it is closer in style 
to the Latin Vulgate than most other English translations.   
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MA, Harvard University Press, 2010-13) 
2
 Stephen Prickett and Robert P. Carroll (eds.), The Bible, Authorised King James Version (Oxford, Oxford 
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Introduction 
The role of warfare in religion has provided a lengthy and much debated field of 
research for historians in recent times. In particular, the Crusades of the Middle Ages provide 
the best example of the long association between Christianity and ‘holy war’. Indeed, there is 
a common conviction that the three Abrahamic faiths: Judaism, Christianity and Islam, are 
somehow inevitably linked to some doctrine of holy war in one form or another. All are 
monotheistic, teleological and adamant that their religion presents the one true way to 
salvation, implicitly rendering all other faiths as redundant and illegitimate. However, this 
understanding of the role of religion in Christianity overlooks a very important fact. While 
Western Christianity produced the Crusades and also eventually a doctrine of holy war to 
justify it, the churches of Eastern Christianity, situated within the Byzantine Empire, did not. 
Eastern Christianity did not practice or condone a form of holy war comparable to that of the 
West, despite its closer proximity to Muslim world, which provided the impetus for the 
Crusades in the first place. The first aim of this thesis then, is to answer the question of why 
Eastern and Western Christianity developed different theologies of warfare during the 
medieval period. What caused this distinction?  Is it the result of a fundamentally different 
theological understanding? Or is it due primarily to more pragmatic issues such as political, 
social and economic structures and values? Secondly, the thesis aims to explore the historical 
implications of these differences. How did the theological positions of the Eastern and 
Western Churches develop and then impact the way Latin and Greek Christians thought 
about warfare? 
The research scope of the thesis covers a fairly wide period of time. While it can be 
broadly described as medieval, there are several aspects that need to be taken into account. 
The first of these is the pre-medieval writing on just war and religious warfare in general, 
which formed the basis of Christian thought on warfare in both East and West. These 
influences include classical Greek and Roman scholars such as Aristotle and Cicero, 
examples of warfare from the Old and New Testaments of the Bible, and opinions from 
within the early Church prior to Constantine. The second grouping focuses on the 
development of the just war tradition within the Western Church. This period starts in the 
fourth century with St Augustine’s original concept of Christian just war, and culminates with 
Thomas Aquinas’ formulation of just war in his Summa Theologiae in the thirteenth century. 
Finally, the Eastern Church’s theological perspective on warfare begins in the fourth century, 
as articulated by St Basil of Caesarea. Due to the nature of the development of the Eastern 
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theology of warfare, the natural endpoint in this study coincides with the capture of 
Constantinople by the Turks in 1453, although the latest meaningful contribution to the topic 
appears with Gregory Palamas in the fourteenth century.  
 
Historiographical Context 
One of the aims of this thesis is to address the lack of comparative studies between 
Eastern and Western Christianity in relation to just war and attitudes to Christian warfare in 
general. There has up to this point in time, been little in the way of a comparative analysis 
between Eastern and Western concepts of warfare, and as a consequence this study will cover 
several fields of historiographical debate.  
The history of just war theory in the Western world is a subject which has received 
comprehensive coverage by scholars in recent times. One of the pre-eminent scholars on the 
history of just war today, James Turner Johnson, identifies the true beginnings of just war as 
a systematic concept or doctrine with the publication of Gratian’s Decretum in the twelfth 
century. While Augustine was obviously hugely influential on medieval thought on the 
subject, only with Gratian “is a comprehensive and continuing inquiry initiated into just 
moral and legal limits to war that produced fruits that defined the just war doctrine of 
Western Christendom in its classic form by the end of the Middle Ages.”3 Contributing to the 
development of just war concepts in medieval Europe, Johnson identifies several key sources. 
The Hebraic tradition, Roman legal concepts, classical philosophy, Christian morality, and 
finally the Germanic warrior culture all contributed towards the specific doctrines that were 
developed in the medieval West in the centuries after Gratian.
4
 Similarly, Frederick H. 
Russell, in The Just War in the Middle Ages, argued that although contributions towards the 
just war theory were made from classical Greece and Rome as well as the Judaeo-Christian 
tradition, it was the events of the twelfth century that led to the development of a systematic 
medieval doctrine of just war.
5
 
Within these studies however, there has been little focus placed on attitudes towards 
warfare within the wider Christian tradition; namely the Eastern Church. While the Eastern 
Church clearly shared some of the cultural elements that led to the development of just war in 
                                                          
3
 James Turner Johnson, Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War: A Moral and Historical Inquiry 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), p. 121 
4
 James Turner Johnson, ‘Historical Roots and Sources of the Just War Tradition in Western Culture’ in John 
Kelsay and James Turner Johnson (eds.), Just War and Jihad: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on War 
and Peace in Western and Islamic Traditions (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), pp. 7-12 
5
 Frederick H. Russell, The Just War in the Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. 292 
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the Western tradition, by the early medieval period a divergent attitude towards war was 
developing between East and West. There is within the current historiography a number of 
comparative studies of just war traditions, but these studies have made the comparison 
between (Western) Christianity and Islam. Scholars such as John Kelsay and James Turner 
Johnson, amongst others, have conducted research comparing the theological traditions of 
just war and jihad in Christianity and Islam respectively.
6
 
The lack of discussion of Eastern Christian approaches to warfare is also repeated in 
other discussions of Christian attitudes towards warfare. Roland Bainton’s influential 
Christian Attitudes towards War and Peace tracks Christian approaches to warfare from the 
New Testament through to the twentieth century.
7
 In his thesis, Bainton argues that there are 
three basic attitudes towards war that developed in the Christian ethic: pacifism, just war, and 
the crusade.
8
 However, in his argument, Bainton pays little attention to the Byzantine attitude 
towards warfare. Although he is seemingly aware that the Byzantines did not adopt the same 
attitudes towards the holy war as the Western Christians, there is no real exploration of the 
Eastern view or an explanation as to why it differed from that of the West.
9
 Similarly, 
discussions of holy war in the historiography of the crusades present little in the way of 
Eastern views on the subject. In Fighting for Christendom, Christopher Tyerman mentions 
that Byzantine Christians had a different attitude towards the concept of just war and holy 
war, but attributes this difference to political circumstances rather than theological 
differences.
10
 Most discussions of the holy war revolve around the reform papacy and the 
influence of the Germanic warrior culture on Western European society. More often than not, 
the development of the crusades is considered in relation to the role of jihad in Islamic 
society rather than the Byzantine approach to warfare, such as in Thomas Asbridge’s 
discussion of the subject in The Crusades.
11
 
The historiography of the Byzantine theology of warfare is therefore limited mainly to 
Byzantinists and Orthodox Christian theologians. Even within Byzantine historiography, the 
theology of warfare is not a subject which receives much attention within general histories of 
                                                          
6
 John Kelsay, Arguing the Just War in Islam (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007); John Kelsay 
and James Turner Johnson (eds.), Just War and Jihad: Historical Perspectives on War and Peace in Western 
and Islamic Traditions (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991) 
7
 Roland H. Bainton, Christian Attitudes Towards War and Peace: A Historical Survey and Critical Re-
evaluation (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1960) 
8
 Bainton, Christian Attitudes Towards War and Peace, p. 14 
9
 Ibid, pp. 112-114  
10
 Christopher Tyerman, Fighting for Christendom: Holy War and the Crusades (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2004), pp. 103,115 
11
 Thomas Asbridge, The Crusades: The Authoritative History of the War for the Holy Land (New York: Ecco 
Press, 2012), pp. 14-19 
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Byzantium or the Eastern Orthodox Church. There does appear however to be a general 
consensus among Byzantinists that the Eastern Church did not develop a doctrine of just war 
similar to that of the Western Church. While there are a number of case studies on Byzantine 
attitudes towards warfare, there have been few comparisons between Western views of just 
war and the reasons behind their divergence. Ioannes Stouraitis’ study Jihad and Crusade: 
Byzantine Positions towards the Notion of ‘Holy War’, examines Byzantine attitudes towards 
holy war in relation to Islamic and Western Christian notions of the concept.
12
 While 
Stouraitis shows the rejection of holy war as a penitential exercise within the Byzantine 
Empire, the scope of his study does not cover the fundamental basis of this divergence with 
Western Christianity. It is only within the field of Eastern Orthodox Patristic theology, that 
the fundamental theological basis for the Eastern Church’s rejection of just war is covered in 
any real depth. While there is not unanimous agreement over the status of just war within 
Orthodoxy, amongst prominent contemporary Orthodox theologians such as Stanley Harakas 
and John McGuckin, there is a clear rejection of the Augustinian understanding of just war, 
and as a necessary consequence, holy war.
13
 The basis of this position comes primarily from 
the authority of St Basil’s canons, and from the theological concept of theosis.  
 
Methodology 
Within the current historiography then, there has not been a lot of scholarly attention 
paid to explaining the divergence of attitudes in the Eastern and Western Churches in regards 
to warfare. This study will explore the reasons behind the divergence of attitudes, and in 
particular look at the role theology played in bringing them about.  One of the key 
methodological considerations which has not been looked at in depth, is the role that 
language played in shaping the Greek and Latin positions on warfare. From the third century 
onwards, a distinctive Latin form of Christianity began to develop within the Western Roman 
Empire, the character of which was shaped significantly by the Latin language and Roman 
culture.
14
 As contact between East and West fell away after the fall of the Western Empire, 
                                                          
12
 Ioannis Stouraitis, ‘Jihad and Crusade: Byzantine Positions towards the Notions of “Holy War’”, Byzantina 
Symmeikta, 21 (2011) pp. 11-63 
13
 John Anthony McGuckin, The Orthodox Church: An Introduction to its History, Doctrine, and Spiritual 
Culture (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008); Fr. Stanley Harakas, “The Teaching of Peace in the Fathers” in Hildo Bos 
and Jim Forest (eds.), For the Peace from Above: An Orthodox Resource Book on War, Peace and Nationalism 
(Bialystok: Orthdruk Printing House, 1999) 
14
 Hans von Campenhausen, The Fathers of the Latin Church, trans. Manfred Hoffman (London: Adam and 
Charles Black, 1964), pp. 1-3 
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differences in liturgy and doctrine began to widen noticeably.
15
 Many of these differences 
between East and West developed due to the “linguistic peculiarities” of Greek and Latin.16 
Although they remained in communion with each other until the schism of 1054, by the 
medieval period few Greek or Latin theologians could speak the others language or had much 
awareness of their theological traditions.
17
 One of the major issues that this study endeavours 
to explore then, is the effect that the Latin and Greek languages had on the interpretation of 
theology, and how that impacted on the development of attitudes towards warfare in the 
Greek and Latin Churches.  
In terms of sources, I have focussed primarily on the two fourth-century theologians 
who prove to be highly influential on the subject of warfare in the East and West for the next 
1000 years. St Augustine in the West and St Basil in the East would provide the basis for the 
attitudes towards warfare in their respective Churches. Augustine’s City of God, along with a 
number of his other writings, contains the essential principles that would shape the medieval 
West’s burgeoning theory of just war.18 Along with Augustine, there are a number of other 
medieval Western sources I have used. Most of these come from the eleventh century 
onwards, as there is a relative lack of sources from the early medieval period. Of these, the 
twelfth-century canon lawyer Gratian and the thirteenth-century theologian Thomas Aquinas 
are highly important. Gratian, through the compilation of the Decretum, brought together for 
the first time in the West a systematic account of Augustine’s just war principles. The 
Decretum would then provide a basis for the development of a just war doctrine within the 
medieval Latin Church. Thomas Aquinas’ discussion of the just war in his Summa 
Theologiae is perhaps the most comprehensive discussions of the just war in the medieval 
period. In comparison to the writings on warfare in the medieval West, there are relatively 
few Byzantine sources which directly address the issue of the Christian just war. St Basil, 
although his position on warfare would prove to be hugely influential within the Eastern 
Church, did not write a lot on the subject. Anna Comnena’s Alexiad provides a first-hand 
account of a Byzantine’s introduction to the First Crusade in the eleventh century.  There are 
however, a number of sources which comment on the topic in a less direct way. I have used 
several Byzantine military manuals, which express the attitudes of Byzantine emperors and 
                                                          
15
 Tia M. Kolbaba, ‘Latin and Greek Christians’ in Thomas F.X. Noble and Julia M.H. Smith (eds.), The 
Cambridge History of Christianity, vol. 3, Early Medieval Christianities c. 600-c. 1100 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008), pp. 213-215 
16
 Jaroslav Pelikan, The Christian Tradition: A History of the Development of Doctrine, vol. 2, The Spirit of 
Eastern Christendom (600-1700) (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1974), p. 179 
17
 Pelikan, The Spirit of Eastern Christendom, pp. 170-182  
18
 Johnson, Just War Tradition, pp. xxiv-xxv 
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generals towards war and the practical implementation of their ideology. Also, while they do 
not comment directly on the concepts of just war or crusade, Byzantine theological critiques 
of the Islamic jihad provide an insight into the attitudes of medieval Byzantines on the issue 
of holy war. 
Although the focus of this study is primarily concerned with examining the impact of 
theology on the development of the Eastern and Western Churches’ different trajectories in 
relation to warfare, the impact of other factors need to be taken into account. In particular, the 
effect of the fall of the Roman Empire in the West and the social, political and economic 
changes it brought about have to be taken into consideration. As well as this, the relationship 
between secular and ecclesiastical authorities differed in Western Europe from the Byzantine 
Empire during the medieval period, a factor which needs to be looked at when examining the 
role of the Church in the affairs of the military.  
The first chapter examines the origins of just war theory within the Latin Church, 
from its antecedents in ancient Roman law, classical philosophy, and the Old and New 
Testaments, through to the development of the Christian principles of just war as defined by 
St Augustine. The primary focus of this chapter is to examine the theological foundations that 
led to Augustine’s endorsement of the just war concept. While Augustine’s writings on just 
war were the most comprehensive and well-thought out Christian position on warfare during 
antiquity, they were founded firmly in earlier Christian and Roman writings on the subject. 
During this period as well, the Latin Christian tradition was beginning to emerge in the 
Western Empire, based mainly in Rome and Carthage. In this chapter, I will analyse the 
impact of Latin language and culture on the development of the Latin Church’s attitude 
towards warfare, and how it compared to the developments in the Greek-speaking Church.   
The second chapter examines the influence of Christian, Roman and Germanic 
attitudes towards war in the West and their impact on the development of the idea of Holy 
War leading up to the First Crusade. Following the fall of the Western Roman Empire, 
Europe faced major social and political upheaval, which effected the further development of 
Augustine’s just war theory. To what extent did theology, such as that of St Augustine’s 
concept of just war, contribute towards the development of holy war and the Crusades in the 
eleventh century? While theological issues played an important part, it is also necessary to 
consider the impact of social and political factors in post-Roman Europe. Less educated, less 
centralised and more violent, the medieval world was a different world than that inhabited by 
Augustine and the early Church Fathers.  
 12 
Chapter Three examines the relationship between the theology of warfare within the 
Eastern Church and its implementation within the Byzantine Empire. The focus of this 
chapter is to examine the correlation between theological concepts of warfare within Eastern 
Christianity and their practical impact on Byzantine attitudes towards warfare. The Eastern 
Church’s position on the issue of just war was most comprehensively articulated by St Basil 
of Caesarea in the fourth century, in which he essentially rejected the just war doctrine that 
would develop in the medieval West. The rest of the chapter looks at the application of St 
Basil’s canons on warfare within Byzantine history. In addition to the theological basis for 
the Byzantine attitude towards warfare, social and political factors are also taken into 
account, such as the effect of Islam on Byzantine society, and the relationship between the 
Byzantine Emperor and the Patriarch of Constantinople.  
The final chapter compares the development of just war theory between East and 
West in the later medieval period. The later medieval period highlighted the growing 
divergence between Christian East and West in regards to just war and the theology of 
warfare in general. The twelfth and thirteenth centuries saw the development of the just war 
and the Crusade from ambiguous concepts to more systematically defined theological 
doctrines. This process of development in the West was exemplified by the just war 
formulation of Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century. Aquinas’ synthesis of Augustinian 
and Aristotelian concepts would be foundational for the modern West’s conception of just 
war. However, this development in the West was contrasted with almost total stasis in the 
East. Byzantine theologians did not appear to show any appetite for development with their 
theology of warfare, and any attempts made to challenge the position stated by St Basil were 
refuted. This chapter examines the growing divergence between the Churches and the various 
factors which contributed towards it.  
Ultimately, the importance of this study is that, unlike previous studies, it focuses on 
the underlying theological reasons behind the different attitudes towards warfare in the 
medieval Greek and Latin Churches. Many studies have been made about the development of 
the just war in the Western tradition, or have compared the Christian crusade to the Islamic 
jihad. This study seeks to explain the divergent positions on warfare between two Christian 
societies that shared the cultural and religious heritage of Rome. By examining the 
theological and linguistic origins of this divergence and their historical implications, we can 
in turn see the role that language and religion has had on shaping many of the foundational 
assumptions of Western civilisation.  
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Chapter One – The Origins of the Just War 
The divergent attitudes towards warfare that developed during the medieval period in 
Western and Eastern Christianity, had their origins in the late Roman Empire. As the Latin 
Church established its own distinct theological tradition in the third century, so too did it 
begin to develop its own unique attitude to the problem of warfare. While the Old and New 
Testament scriptures provided the basis for Christian thought on the subject, the Western 
Church also began to borrow concepts from outside of Christianity. The Christianisation of 
the empire in the fourth century had led the Church to confront the moral status of warfare 
and the role that Christians would play in it. The Western Church would turn to the Roman 
concept of the just war to resolve the tensions between the moral problem of bloodshed and 
the need to protect the Roman Empire from its enemies. Through the person of St Augustine 
(354-430 AD), a synthesis between the Roman just war and Christian morality would be 
developed which would prove foundational to Western thought for the next thousand years.  
 
Latin Christianity 
 
The development of a distinct just war tradition in Western Christianity needs to be 
understood within the wider context of Christianity within the Roman Empire. From the third 
century onwards, a distinct Latin form of Christianity, with its own ecclesiastical life and 
theology, began to emerge within the Western Roman Empire.
19
 As Latin Christianity began 
to develop its own independent intellectual identity, its character was shaped heavily by Latin 
language and culture. The unique nature of the Latin language, and the philosophical 
inheritance of Roman civilisation would significantly impact on the way the early Fathers of 
the Western Church approached the Christian faith.  
The emergence of the Latin Christian tradition was comparatively late, when 
compared with that of the Greeks. Although Christianity is ostensibly a Jewish religion, right 
from the beginning Greek language and culture were an important part of the growing 
Christian tradition. The New Testament was written in Greek, and Greek-speakers occupied 
influential positions within the Church from its inception.
20
 In addition to this, Greek was 
also the lingua franca of the Roman Empire during the first and second centuries.
21
 While 
                                                          
19
von Campenhausen, Fathers of the Latin Church, p. 1 
20
 Ibid, pp. 1-2 
21
 Pierre de Labriolle, The History and Literature of Christianity: From Tertullian to Boethius, trans. Herbert 
Wilson (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1924) pp. 40-42 
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Latin was the official language and widely spoken in the West, in large Western cities with 
immigrant populations such as Rome and Carthage, Greek was the most commonly used 
language.
22
 Even Paul’s epistle to the Romans from the first century, was written in Greek 
rather than Latin.
23
 Because the Greek-speaking world already had a vast tradition of 
theological speculation and biblical commentary, the flow of intellectual thought tended to be 
from East to West, and not the other way around.
24
 Because of these factors, the development 
of a Latin form of Christianity occurred relatively slowly.  
By the third century however, there was within the Western Roman Empire, a distinct 
Latin form of Christianity beginning to emerge, with a recognisably different attitude towards 
theology from that of the Greek East. The development of this tradition was based primarily 
in two Western cities, Rome and Carthage.
25
 The unique character of Western Christianity 
was shaped heavily by the Latin language and the culture which it spawned. Latin differs 
greatly from Greek, and its idiosyncrasies affect the way theology is understood. As noted by 
Steven Runciman: 
 
While Greek is a subtle and flexible tongue, admirably suited to express every shade of abstract 
thought, Latin is far more rigid and inelastic; it is clear, concrete, and uncompromising, a perfect 
medium for lawyers.
26
 
 
The linguistic character of the Latin language can also be observed in the culture of 
the ancient Roman people. In both their secular and religious life, the pagan Romans were an 
extremely legalistic people.
27
 Right from the beginning of recorded history in Rome, there 
has existed a fascination with law and the legal process.
28
 These characteristics also naturally 
express themselves within the writings of the early Fathers of the Latin Church. Tertullian, 
one of the first recognisable Fathers of the Latin Church, is defined intellectually by his 
realism, legalism and emphasis on will, standards and discipline.
29
 Indeed, early Latin 
Christianity shared many traits with Judaism, and many of the early Latin Fathers, such as 
                                                          
22
 Ibid., pp. 40-42 
23
 Ibid., p. 42 
24
 von Campenhausen, Latin Church, p. 1 
25
 W.H.C. Frend, The Rise of Christianity (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1984), p. 339 
26
 Steven Runciman, The Eastern Schism: A Study of the Papacy and the Eastern Churches During the XIth and 
XIIth Centuries (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1955), p. 8 
27
 Alan Watson, International Law in Archaic Rome: War and Religion (Baltimore: John Hopkins University 
Press, 1993), p. 66 
28
 Watson, International Law in Archaic Rome, pp. 66-67 
29
 von Campenhausen, Fathers of the Latin Church, p. 35 
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Tertullian and Jerome, had a particular affinity for the books of the Old Testament.
30
 Before 
Augustine in the late fourth century, Latin Christianity was very Jewish in character, 
described by Hans von Campenhausen as essentially ‘moral, legalistic, and rigorous’.31 While 
through theologians such as St Augustine, who had a far greater empathy for the works of 
pagan philosophers such as Plato and Cicero, Western Christianity would open itself up to a 
more philosophical approach to theology, it would also retain its own distinctive Latin 
character. 
 
The Graeco-Roman Contribution to Just War 
 
While the concept of just war is most prominently associated with theorists within the 
Christian tradition, the foundations of the concept can be seen in the classical societies of 
Greece and Rome. The Greek philosopher Aristotle would be one of the first authors to 
examine the subject of just war, and his discussions on warfare and ethics in general would 
have a major impact on the later medieval Western understanding of just war, in particular on 
the thought of Thomas Aquinas. As well as the Greeks, the Roman concept of just war would 
prove to be highly influential in the development of attitudes towards war in the Latin 
Church. Both Ambrose of Milan and Augustine owe much of their legal justification of 
warfare to the principles laid down by the Roman orator Cicero. 
The first man to coin the phrase ‘just war’ was the philosopher Aristotle (384-322 
B.C.).
32
 A student of Plato and one of the greatest philosophers of antiquity, Aristotle would 
have a significant impact on the development of the just war theory. Like Plato, he did not 
write specifically on the subject of just war or formulate a legal definition of the concept. 
Rather, Aristotle’s discussions on the nature of warfare are given to us through his teachings 
on ethics, namely the Nicomachean Ethics and The Politics. Related to Aristotle’s views on 
warfare are his discussions on the matter of courage and virtue on the battlefield, the 
distinction between natural and legal justice, and the issue of slavery. 
In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle draws the distinction between two different 
forms of political justice: natural justice and legal justice. Natural justice refers to a certain 
code of conduct in operation in human society which is applicable everywhere, regardless of 
                                                          
30
 Ibid., pp. 3, 35, 180 
31
 Ibid., pp. 183-184 
32
 Aristotle, The Politics, 1.8.1256b26, (ed.) Stephen Everson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 
p. 11 
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language, religion or ethnicity.
33
 Legal justice refers to laws decided by convention, “what 
originally makes no difference whether it takes one form or another, but does matter when 
people have adopted it.”34 These laws are decided arbitrarily and vary from place to place. In 
regards to the subject of war, war could be considered just under two circumstances: in self-
defence, or to extend dominion over those who Aristotle considered to be ‘natural slaves’.35 
This is not to say that Aristotle was by any means an advocate of unrestricted warfare. For 
Aristotle, war was not a means unto itself. War could be necessary and just, but it could not 
be justified for its own sake.
36
 In particular, he criticised those states which had based the 
laws of their societies around warfare, such as the Spartans, for whom making war and 
conquest was their sole aim.
37
 Aristotle argued that the laws of a society should be framed 
towards what is honourable, rather than what is necessary: 
 
For men must be able to engage in business and to go to war, but leisure and peace are better; they 
must do what is necessary and indeed useful, but what is honourable is better.
38
  
 
In addition to discussing the ethics of war on a political level, Aristotle also examined 
the concepts of courage on the battlefield as they related to the individual. For a soldier, 
ethical considerations were just as important as the fighting itself. A truly brave man, aside 
from avoiding the extremes of cowardice and recklessness, is brave because he fights for the 
right reasons: 
 
So the courageous person is the one who endures and fears – and likewise is confident about – the right 
things, for the right reason, in the right way, at the right time.
39
  
 
The impact of Aristotle’s ideas on the development of the just war theory would prove 
to be significant.  While he did not develop any kind of systematic discussion of the topic, 
Aristotle was one of the first to articulate the concept of a just war and its ethical basis. In the 
context of the just war in Latin Christianity though, Aristotle’s influence was not felt for a 
long time. During late antiquity, Aristotelian philosophy had lost its popularity in favour of 
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the neo-Platonism of pagan philosophers such as Plotinus and Porphyry.
40
 When rediscovered 
by the West through the extensive translation of his writings in the twelfth century, his 
discussion of subjects such as natural and legal justice, amongst others, would prove to be 
hugely influential on the scholars of medieval Christendom.
41
 In particular, Thomas Aquinas, 
one of the greatest proponents of medieval just war theory, owed a huge debt to Aristotle’s 
philosophy on a wide range of topics.
42
 His concept of the common good, which shaped 
much his just war definitions, was based heavily on Aristotelian principles. 
During the period of the late Roman Empire though, the Roman just war tradition 
would prove to be more directly influential on the attitudes of Christian theologians towards 
warfare. The concept of just war was embedded both in traditional Roman religion and in 
secular law as well. One of the last great contributors towards the theory of the just war in 
classical times was the Roman orator Marcus Tullius Cicero (106-43 B.C.). In his most 
famous work, On Duties, Cicero gives us one of the clearest expositions of just war ideas 
from a Roman perspective. Written as a tutorial book for his son Marcus, On Duties covers 
all aspects of Roman statesmanship, including warfare. In contrast to Aristotle, Cicero clearly 
articulates what defines a just war, and in particular establishes a criterion of just causes for 
war.
43
 
The concept of the just war has a long tradition in pre-imperial Roman history. Pagan 
Rome had a reputation amongst other nations for being both a highly religious and very 
legalistic society.
44
 Roman state religion reflected the legalism of Roman secular culture, and 
was concerned overwhelmingly with correct observance of ritual, rather any particular set of 
beliefs or theology.
45
 Romans were proud of their religiosity, and attributed much of their 
military success to their piety.
46
 In this context then, the issue of warfare and its correct 
prosecution were of crucial importance to the Roman people.
47
 It was essential that any war 
Rome fought must be just, and that justice was established by the proper legal and religious 
procedures.
48
 In archaic Roman society, a group of priests called the fetiales were responsible 
“for the proper, religious conduct of international relations, including the observance of the 
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sacred forms.”49 The fetiales would go through an elaborate legal process to ensure the war 
was just, through the making of demands for reparations, calling on the gods to act as judges 
between the two sides, and the actual declaration of the war itself.
50
 The use of fetiales was 
common throughout Latium, but as Rome continued to expand, the ius fetiale system broke 
down when Rome came into contact with other religious tradition.
51
 Nonetheless, while by 
the time of the empire any overt religious rituals had disappeared from Roman warfare, 
formal declaration and observance of correct legal procedure was integral to the Roman 
concept of just war.
52
  
The traditional Roman attitude towards warfare can be observed in Cicero’s 
discussion of the just war. Cicero defines justice primarily as “good faith – that is, truth and 
fidelity to promises and agreements”.53 Injustice is defined in two ways: “the one, on those 
who inflict wrong, the other on the part of those who, when they can, do not shield from 
wrong those upon whom it is being inflicted”.54 For Cicero, warfare is considered very much 
to be a last resort, one to be taken after all other avenues have been explored.
55
  Indeed, in his 
discussion of the relative merits of military and civic virtues, Cicero argues that civic duties 
are more virtuous than military ones.
56
 When warfare is inevitable however, it should be 
pursued for the sake of peace and with the aim of the restoration of justice, either in the 
pursuit of self-defence or honour.
57
 Following these general principles, Cicero presents a set 
of criteria, under which combatants are said to have just cause for making war. War must be 
preceded by a formal declaration and only if demands for reparations have not been met, and 
prisoners of war must be treated fairly.
58
 Honour also must be seen to be maintained, even 
between enemies. If a promise has been made between enemies in wartime, justice demands 
that it must be kept.
59
 In this manner, war was not conceived so much as an act of wilful 
violence, but rather as a just and honourable endeavour pursued for the eradication of 
injustices.
60
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The Roman understanding of the just war, and in particular the criteria specified by 
Cicero, would be hugely influential on the development of just war concepts in Western 
Christianity. In both of their discussions on just war, Augustine and Ambrose would base 
their criteria for just war heavily on Cicero’s principles. Crucially, Western Christianity 
would adopt the Roman legal framework when considering the issue of warfare and then 
apply it within a Christian moral and theological context. 
 
Warfare in the Old and New Testament 
 
The traditions and philosophy of pagan Greece and Rome were, of course, only partly 
responsible for the development of attitudes towards warfare in the early Christian Church. 
The holy books of Christianity, the Hebrew Old Testament and the gospels and epistles that 
would make up the New Testament, provided the backbone of the Christian faith and would 
prove ultimately authoritative on any questions relating to warfare. The two collections of 
books do however, present different depictions of war. The Old Testament is replete with 
descriptions of war, recounting events such as Joshua’s campaign against Canaan, the 
struggle between the Jews and the Philistines, and the eventual capitulation of the kingdom of 
Judah at the hands of the Babylonians. The New Testament does not cover the subject of war 
to the same degree as the Old Testament, but has nonetheless provided passages later used to 
both justify and denigrate Christian participation in warfare.  
In the Old Testament, the God of the Jews, Yahweh, takes an active role in the 
business of warfare throughout Israel’s history. The armies of the Hebrews fight under the 
authority of Yahweh, and Yahweh himself is described as actively fighting on behalf of the 
Hebrews. In the account of the Hebrews’ escape from captivity in Egypt, it is Yahweh who 
fights directly on behalf of the Hebrews against the Egyptians, drowning the Egyptian army 
in the Red Sea.
61
 In the ‘Song of the Sea’, Yahweh is described by the Hebrews as a warrior 
fighting on their behalf.
62
 Moses, under Yahweh’s authority, commanded the Israelites 
against the Amelekites in the desert and defeated them.
63
 This trend continues throughout the 
conquest of Canaan. While Joshua is the military leader of the campaign, Yahweh is 
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described as the war leader.
64
 Through the will of God, Israel is commanded to destroy the 
nations of Canaan: 
 
When the Lord, thy God, shall have brought thee into the land which thou art going to possess and shall 
have destroyed many nations before thee, the Hittite and the Girgashite and the Amorite and the 
Canaanite and the Perizzite and the Hivite and the Jebusite, seven nations much more numerous than 
thou art and stronger than thou, and the Lord, thy God, shall have delivered them to thee, thou shalt 
utterly destroy them. Thou shalt make no league with them nor shew mercy to them.
65
 
 
As well as actively intervening on the side of the Hebrews in battle, Yahweh has also 
been portrayed as an agent of judgement against the nation of Israel.
66
 Throughout the Bible, 
there are many examples where Yahweh is described as using warfare as a tool of judgement 
against the nations of the earth. The invasion of Canaan, as well as providing the Hebrews 
their promised land, portrayed the defeat of the Canaanites as righteous judgement for their 
blasphemous ways.
67
 The total destruction of the Canaanites is necessary ‘lest they teach you 
to do all the abominations which they have done to their gods and you should sin against the 
Lord, your God’.68 This judgement would however prove to be a double-edged sword for the 
Jews, resulting in the destruction of their kingdom and eventual exile. The Bible portrays the 
Hebrews as falling away from Yahweh in the latter years of the kingdom, ignoring the 
covenant and adopting the customs of the surrounding nations. As punishment, the northern 
kingdom of Israel suffered defeat at the hands of the Assyrians, and eventually, Yahweh 
raised up the army of Babylon to invade the kingdom of Judah and carry off the people into 
exile.
69
 Throughout the Old Testament then, there are a number of precedents for Yahweh 
actively involving himself in warfare and using it as a tool of judgement. 
Unlike the Old Testament, the New Testament of the Bible barely mentions the topic 
of war at all. Jesus Christ makes statements only indirectly related to the subject, while the 
New Testament authors are focussed almost entirely on issues within the early Church and do 
not cover the issue in any depth. This is due primarily to the different literary styles of the 
two collections. The Old Testament is concerned with telling, amongst other things, the 
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history of the political nation of Israel. Conversely, the New Testament is written primarily 
for the Church, to instruct and teach Christians on right belief and action. 
The New Testament gospels do not give much insight into the thought of Jesus Christ 
on the subject of warfare. Jesus never addresses the issue directly, so there is no definitive 
statement from Jesus on the status of war as a just or a sinful act. There are a number of 
indirect references though, from which Christians have argued both for and against the issue 
of warfare. In the Beatitudes, Jesus exhorts his followers to act in humility and resolve 
conflicts peacefully, and even to love their enemies: 
 
But I say unto you, love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and 
pray for them which despitefully use you, and persecute you.
70
 
 
Elsewhere in the gospels, both Matthew and Luke record an interaction between Jesus 
and a Roman centurion, whose servant was seriously ill.
71
 In both accounts, Jesus heals the 
centurion’s servant, and remarks of him that: ‘I have not found so great faith, no, not in 
Israel’.72 Jesus says nothing of the nature of the soldier’s profession, an omission which is 
noticed by St Augustine, and used as an argument which allowed the possibility of Christians 
serving in the military.
73
 The gospel account of Jesus’ arrest in the Garden of Gethsemane 
provides another example of an encounter with soldiers.
74
 When the soldiers attempt to arrest 
Jesus, Simon Peter cuts off the ear of the high priest’s servant.75 Jesus rebukes Peter, calling 
him to: ‘put up again thy sword into its place: for all they that take the sword shall perish with 
the sword’.76 For some early Church writers, most notably Tertullian, this statement 
prohibited Christians from taking up arms in any form.
77
 Due to the lack of any specific 
statement on the subject of warfare though, Jesus’ gospel account was used both for and 
against Christian participation in warfare. 
References to the subject of war in the New Testament, outside of the gospels, are 
also few and far between. The focus of the New Testament authors is very much on the 
conduct of the early Church and on providing guidelines for living for members of the 
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Church. Given the context of the Church in the first century Roman Empire, political matters 
outside of compliance with those in government at the time were not really touched upon. 
Warfare is mentioned in passages throughout the New Testament, but much of it is 
metaphorical or hyperbolic. Paul uses military metaphors to describe good Christians putting 
on the ‘armour of God’ to help fight against “spiritual wickedness in high places”.78 In 
Revelation, John uses symbolic imagery of war to describe God’s judgement on mankind.79 
Practical considerations of Christians within the Roman legions or on the justice of war are 
not touched upon. Paul does however, urge that Christians should submit to the governing 
authorities, as the authorities that exist have been “ordained of God”. Whatever Christians are 
considered to owe the authorities, they are expected to give
80
.  
 
Warfare and the Early Church 
 
Throughout the twentieth century there was a general acceptance of the view that up 
until the reign of Constantine in the fourth century, Christian attitudes towards warfare were 
generally pacifistic. The two most prominent proponents of this view were Roland Bainton 
and John C. Cadoux. Essentially, they argue that from the period of the early Church in the 
first century, Christianity was pacifistic by nature and against warfare or bloodshed of any 
kind. The third century Church Fathers condemned the practice of Christians fighting in the 
Roman legions, and it was not until the fourth century, when Constantine became emperor 
and eventually the Roman Empire was Christianised, that the idea of Christians participating 
in warfare came to be accepted.
81
 More recently however, this view of the early Christian 
attitude to warfare has come under scrutiny. In particular, James Turner Johnson has 
criticised Bainton and Cadoux’s position, and argued that while just war concepts were 
certainly further developed by men such as Ambrose and Augustine, they were not without 
precedent in the early Church. Johnson’s criticism is based around two main themes: the 
social world of the early Christian communities, and the nature of the early Church Fathers’ 
rejection of military service.
82
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Both Bainton and Cadoux argue that pacifism was the normative position for 
Christians immediately after the establishment of the Church in the first century. This view 
comes partly from the fact that until the late second century, there is no evidence that 
Christians were serving in the Roman military. The fact that Christians did not serve in the 
military was taken for granted.
83
 When it becomes clear that Christians were serving in the 
military, the third century Christian writers condemned the practice. However, as Johnson 
shows, there are other factors that need to be taken into account. 
Social and demographic factors were a major influence on the reason why Christians 
did not join the military in the formative years of the Church. For the most part, Christians 
did not join the military because there was very little incentive to do so. This is due to the fact 
that the people who became Christians were not likely to join the military anyway, and lived 
in places where the army did not traditionally recruit from. In the early Church, a significant 
proportion of the people who joined the new faith were not eligible for military service. Many 
Christians were either women, slaves or Jews, few of whom would be able to join the army, 
even if they were inclined to do so.
84
 In addition to this, early Christianity was almost 
exclusively an urban phenomenon.
85
 Most of the large Christian centres during the first 
century were based in cities well away from warzones or large military garrisons. 
Traditionally, recruits for the legions came from rural as opposed to urban areas, and often 
from regions near the frontiers of the empire.
86
 Rural Romans, due to the nature of their 
upbringing, were generally far better equipped for military service, and because of these 
factors there was little need for urban Romans to join the military.
87
 It must also be 
remembered that at this early stage, the Church was still very small relative to the empire, and 
would take until the third century to establish itself as a major religion within the empire
88
.  
As well as these social issues, there is also a theological reason for the lack of interest 
by Christians on issues such as military service or the status of warfare. In the pacifist 
interpretation, there is an implicit belief that Christianity was understood by the early 
Christians as a transformative movement. In this view, warfare and military service were 
rejected because Christians had a greater moral vision for the world.
89
 However, this view 
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needs to be balanced with the eschatological views within early Christianity. In the early 
Church, there was a strong perception amongst many that the return of Jesus was imminent, 
and that the old order would pass away and be replaced by a new one.
90
 Because of this, 
many Christians sought to separate themselves from ‘the world’ as much as possible. Warfare 
and military service were indeed rejected, but on the basis that it was a tool of the state, along 
with many other activities.
91
 The gradual shift away from this eschatological view, as 
Christians sought to live within the apparatus of the empire, makes more sense of the 
attitudes of Christians towards war after Constantine. The pacifist interpretation requires a 
complete overthrow of Christian principles in the previous three centuries, to go from a 
wholesale rejection of war to its enthusiastic support by the majority of the Christian 
community.  
By the end of the second century, there is definite evidence that Christians were active 
in the Roman army, and in relatively large numbers as well. This development can be 
attributed to a number of changing social and demographic factors. By the third century, 
Christianity was growing rapidly and unexpectedly, and moving outside of its primarily 
urban base.
92
 By the reign of Diocletian at the beginning of the fourth century, it is possible 
that as much as ten percent of the empire may have been Christian. In addition to the growth 
of the Christian population, there was also a changing perception of the relationship between 
Christians and the empire. The early eschatological, sectarian Christian beliefs had mostly 
died out, and Christians had become much more active in the affairs of the empire.
93
 These 
factors had an effect on Christian perceptions of the military, and consequently there had 
developed a considerable Christian presence within the Roman legions.  
By the third century then, the previously ignored subject of warfare becomes a point 
of discussion for a number of Christian writers. In their discussions of the issue of warfare, 
while there is a general distaste for warfare and the role of Christians in the military, there are 
a diverse range of justifications for these positions. One of the earliest recorded opinions on 
the matter came from Justin Martyr (103-165). For him, the arrival of Christianity was the 
fulfilment of the Old Testament prophecy of Isaiah, an age of peace where the nations: 
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shall turn their swords into ploughshares and their spears into sickles. Nation shall not lift up sword 
against nation, neither shall they be exercised any more to war.
94
 
 
 Because of this, Christians should refuse to make war against their enemies under all 
circumstances.
95
 Tertullian (160-220) provides a more nuanced argument against military 
service on two grounds. Firstly, he made the point that it would not be fitting for a ‘son of 
peace’ to take part in battles, prisons, tortures and punishments.96 Although in the Old 
Testament, the Patriarchs used the sword as a means to carry out God’s will, for him, Jesus’ 
act of taking away Peter’s sword in the garden of Gethsemane thereby ‘disarmed every 
soldier thereafter’.97 Tertullian’s objection to military service is also related to the pagan 
practices that permeated the Roman military: 
 
Will a son of peace who should not even go to court take part in battle [?] Will a man who does not 
avenge wrongs done to himself have any part in chains, prisons, tortures and punishments [?] Will he 
perform guard duty for anyone other than Christ, or will he do so on the Lord’s day when he is not 
doing it for Christ himself [?]
98
 
 
It is important to note that Tertullian’s objections on this basis are related to his 
adherence in later life to a form of Christianity called Montanism.
99
 Similar to many early 
first century Christians, Montanists believed Christians should separate themselves from 
worldly affairs, which while precluding military service also applied to professions such as 
teaching and the civil service.
100
 
Most other Christian writers were not so emphatically pacifistic however. There 
appears to be a strong tension between the antipathy Christians had towards bloodshed of any 
kind, and the desire to acknowledge faithfully the authority of the Roman state and the 
obedience of Christians toward it. In the Apostolic Tradition of Hippolytus (170-235), a 
distinction is made between combat soldiers and soldiers of the civil authorities.
101
 While 
Christians are prohibited from joining the regular army, soldiers serving the civil authorities 
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are acceptable provided they do not kill anyone and refuse to take oaths.
102
 St Cyprian of 
Carthage (d. 258), while not advocating one way or the other in regards to Christian military 
service, clearly laments its existence. “The world is wet with mutual blood(shed): homicide is 
a crime when individuals commit it, (but) it is called a virtue, when it is carried out 
publicly”.103 Clement of Alexandria (150-215), while again deploring the existence of war, 
nonetheless treats the profession of soldiery largely with impartiality. In the same manner as 
the farmer or sailor who becomes a Christian, a soldier who comes to faith is to remain in his 
calling serve in a manner which is just.
104
 
This tension is articulated well in the writings of Origen (185-254) on the subject of 
war and military service. When looking at the issue of whether Christians can rightfully 
participate in warfare, Origen answers in the negative. While in the Old Testament, wars 
were fought by the Hebrews under God’s authority, Origen insists that these wars are to be 
understood allegorically: 
 
Thus, the Apostle, being aware that physical wars are no longer to be waged by us but that our 
struggles are to be only battles of the soul against spiritual adversaries, gives orders to the soldiers of 
Christ like a military commander when he says, “Put on the armor of God so as to be able to hold your 
ground against the wiles of the devil” (Ephesians 6:11).105 
 
However, Origen also recognised the authority of the emperor on the basis of Romans 
13 and Timothy 2:1-2, and the necessity for wars to be fought against enemies of Rome.
106
 
He acknowledged that the armies of Rome could do battle in a just cause under the just rule 
of the emperor, killing its enemies for the common good.
107
 However, just as pagan priests 
were not enlisted in times of war, Christians should reasonably be allowed to ‘keep their right 
hands clean’.108 Instead, through prayer and petition to God, Christians could assist the 
armies of the empire.
109
 In these statements, Origen is not arguing over the necessity of war 
itself (he admits that it is necessary), but over the appropriate role for Christians to take in 
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response to warfare. Christians can pray for the righteous victory of Rome’s armies over her 
enemies, but cannot themselves participate.  
The conversion of Constantine to Christianity in 312 A.D. would precipitate a 
massive cultural shift in the Roman Empire over the next century.
110
 Although by the 
beginning of the fourth century Christianity had an increasingly strong presence within the 
Empire, it was still held in low regard by many Romans. The conversion of Constantine gave 
Christianity a sense of legitimacy within the empire, and its favoured status gradually enticed 
many converts from the Roman upper classes.
111
 The Edict of Milan, issued by Constantine 
in 313, would officially legalise Christianity, which had up to that point been illegal and had 
recently suffered heavy persecution under the reign of the Emperor Diocletian (303-311). The 
rise of Christianity would continue throughout Constantine’s reign and beyond, and in 380 
the Edict of Thessalonika would establish Christianity as the official religion of the Roman 
Empire.  
The effect of the changing relationship between the Roman Empire and Christianity 
could not help but also affect the Christian attitude towards warfare. While James Turner 
Johnson argues forcefully that pre-Constantinian Christianity was not necessarily pacifistic 
and was potentially open to a limited form of just war, the impact of Constantine’s 
conversion on Christian attitudes towards war was significant. In the North African apologist 
Lactantius (240-320 AD), we can observe the effect of Constantine on his view of the 
relationship between Christianity and the empire. Prior to Constantine, Lactantius still 
represented a strong anti-war element within the Church. Lactantius maintained that God’s 
prohibition of killing extended not just to what is unlawful, but also to what men regard as 
ethical.
112
 Christians are still forbidden from serving in the army; killing a human being, he 
argues, is without exception, a sinful act.
113After Constantine’s conversion however, 
Lactantius in his writings shows a newfound loyalty to the emperor, hailing the man “who 
has restored justice and wisdom to human affairs.”114 
After Constantine, the exclusively pacifistic voices within the Church become much 
rarer, and a general consensus emerges for the necessity and permissibility of warfare for 
Christians within the empire. However, the extent to which Christians could participate, and 
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the moral status of warfare was still up for debate. During the fourth century, Eastern and 
Western Christianity began to develop different approaches to these questions.  
In the East, several different approaches to warfare emerge in the fourth century. One 
of these positions is provided by Eusebius of Caesarea (263-339 AD) who hails the new 
partnership of the Roman Empire and the Christian religion as a fulfilment of Isaiah 2:4, 
delivered through the Pax Romana.
115
 While Eusebius is still an enthusiastic supporter of the 
virtues of peace, it is now being delivered and upheld through the institution of the Roman 
Empire and its legions.
116
 To ameliorate the contentious issue of Christian involvement in the 
military, Eusebius posits the creation of two grades of human conduct: that fitting to the laity 
and that suitable to the clergy.
117
 While the laity are permitted to marry, fight just wars and 
involve themselves in civic duties, the clergy are prescribed a life of celibacy, poverty and 
separation from the world.
118
 While allowing for the necessity of warfare, Eusebius leaves its 
prosecution entirely in the secular domain, specifically the armies of the Roman Empire. St 
Basil of Caesarea (329-379), while admitting the need for soldiers to defend the empire in the 
interests of ‘sobriety and piety’, made the observation that those who participate in bloodshed 
have ‘hands that are not clean’, and must abstain from communion for three years.119 This 
understanding of the moral status of warfare, would prove to be highly influential in Eastern 
Christianity during the medieval period. 
The attitude towards warfare in Western Christianity would develop in a different 
direction to that of the East. In particular, the traditional Roman concept of just war would 
heavily influence the way Western Christian theologians viewed the morality of warfare. St 
Ambrose of Milan (337-397) would be one of the first theologians to fuse Christian ethics 
with the Roman concept of just war. One of the first rhetorically trained bishops in the 
Western Church, Ambrose came from a wealthy family with a strong upbringing in classical 
literature.
120
 Ambrose has been described by some as a ‘Christian Cicero’, providing a 
Christian version of the Roman just war.
121
 Like Cicero, he believed that wars should only be 
fought for just causes, and that honour and respect for the enemy’s rights must be maintained 
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during wartime.
122
 To support these ideas, Ambrose appealed to stories of the Old Testament, 
where figures such as Moses, Joshua and David used warfare to vanquish their enemies.
123
 In 
addition to his support for a form of Roman just war, Ambrose adds a few Christian nuances. 
He condemns the practice of self-defence, but allows Christians to fight on behalf of the 
defenceless or in defence of the state.
124
 Furthermore, he prohibits clerics and monks from 
military service, as war is not their domain, but rather steers their energies ‘to the forces of 
peace’.125 
The perception of war within the early Church changed significantly from the first to 
the fourth century. The growth of Christianity, and its evolution from a small Jewish sect to 
the official religion of the Roman Empire, forced Christian theologians to consider problems 
they would never have dreamt of in the first few decades of the Church. The Church 
attempted to maintain its peaceful values while at the same time reconciling itself to the 
defence of the Roman Empire. By the end of the fourth century, there was a general 
acceptance of the role that the military played within the Roman Empire. After this point 
however, Western and Eastern Christianity began to diverge in their respective attitudes 
towards warfare. St Ambrose touched upon this through his combination of Roman just war 
and Christian ethics. His stance on war, however, was incomplete. It would take one of the 
greatest minds of late antiquity to sythesise the just war of the Romans and the ethical 
principles of Christianity.  
 
The Just War According to St Augustine 
 
St Augustine (354-430 AD) would prove to be the definitive voice on the subject of 
just war leading up to the Middle Ages.
126
 An heir to the wisdom of classical antiquity, 
Augustine would bring together the various strands of Greek and Roman thought, together 
with examples given in the Old and New Testaments of the Bible.
127
 For while he was a 
Christian, he remained heavily influenced by authors such as the Roman orator Cicero, the 
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Greek philosopher Plato and the school of neo-platonic philosophy he inspired.
128
 While 
Augustine’s legacy on the subject of just war is not to be underestimated, it must be said that 
he never fully systemised his thoughts on the just war. Rather, they remain scattered 
somewhat haphazardly throughout his voluminous writings.
129
 Because of this lack of 
systemisation, Augustine’s coverage of certain aspects of war are coloured by a number of 
contemporary political issues unique to Roman North Africa, where he lived for all but five 
years of his life.
130
 In particular, Augustine’s opinions on the use of force in religious matters 
were heavily influenced by the events surrounding the Donatist heresy in North Africa in the 
early fifth century. 
At the very core of Augustine’s theory of just war is the Christian concept of sin. The 
description of the fall of man in Genesis, introducing sin and death into the world, forever 
corrupted mankind and prevented him from attaining perfection in this life.
131
 As a younger 
man, Augustine had entertained the belief in the possibility of human perfection in this life, a 
position he would later abandon.
132
 In his conception of the two cities, the ‘City of God’ and 
the ‘Earthly City’, although Christians belong to the City of God, they are in this life forced 
to lead a ‘life of captivity’ while they are alive in the earthly city.133 Because of its temporal 
nature, the earthly city will always be subject to strife and conflict.
134
 Mankind will never be 
free of suffering, and there will never be a shortage of wars to fight and enemies to face.
135
 
Only in the next life will true peace be realised, to those chosen by God.
136
 Because of the 
current state of mankind, discipline and punishment through the law was given to mankind to 
curtail and correct his evil nature.
137
 War is ultimately therefore the product of sin, but 
through the law, can also be harnessed as a corrective and disciplinary measure. 
For Augustine, the prospect of war invites no joy. Indeed, throughout his writings on 
the subject, war presents itself as an unmitigated evil. He describes the man who experiences 
or even contemplates such evils without heartfelt grief, as one who has ‘lost all human 
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feeling’.138 It is not just the suffering of war which is lamentable for Augustine, but perhaps 
more importantly the vices which it stirs up within people:  
 
The desire for harming, the cruelty of revenge, the restless and implacable mind, the savageness of 
revolting, the lust for dominating, and similar things – these are what are justly blamed in wars.139 
 
Looking at the Roman Empire, Augustine sees these same vices at work. Ever since 
its first conquest of Alba, Rome itself was conquered by the ‘lust for mastery’ over other 
peoples.
140
 While Rome’s great conquest brought uniformity in language and the Pax 
Romana, Augustine questions whether even these benefits can justify the blood that was shed 
to bring them about.
141
 While a just man by necessity may be forced to undertake a just war, 
he at the same time laments the fact that he has to fight at all.
142
  
As regretful as the spectre of war appears to be for Augustine, he nonetheless 
concedes that it is, at times, the only remedy against oppression and injustice. War becomes 
necessary when the alternative outcome appears worse than the prospect of the war itself. 
While it is preferable ‘to have a good neighbour and live in peace with him [rather] than to 
subdue a bad neighbour when he makes war’, such a war is a necessity ‘since it would be still 
worse for the unrighteous to lord it over the just.’143 Furthermore, it is because of the injustice 
of the opposing side that just men are forced to take part.
144
 Above all, however, war can 
become necessary for the sake of peace. While the earthly city will forever be subject to 
conflict and dissension, even an earthly peace is preferable to continuing conflict. For the 
earthly city, this peace often has to come about through making war.
145
 
Given the suffering and vices brought about by war itself though, how could it 
possibly be just? Augustine’s answer to this question lies in his interpretation of the concept 
of Christian charity and love. In the New Testament, Jesus teaches two main precepts: love of 
God and love of neighbour. In turn, man finds three objects for his love: God, himself and his 
neighbour. Augustine gives the example of a household, where ideally the husband gives 
orders to his wife, parents to children, and masters to servants. Those in command should not 
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give these orders ‘because of a lust for domination but from a dutiful concern for the interests 
of others, not with pride in taking precedence over others, but with compassion in taking care 
of others’.146 Right and wrong do not reside in outward acts, but rather they depend on the 
inward disposition.  Taking the example of Elijah in the book of 2 Kings, Elijah was 
warranted in bringing down fire from heaven against the messengers of Ahaziah, because he 
had love in his heart both for God and spiritual well-being of the Jewish nation.
147
 Whereas in 
the book of Luke, Jesus rebuked the disciples for wishing the same thing, as they were 
motivated by vengeful intent.
148
 Augustine maintained that it was not impossible for those in 
the military to please God, citing the case of the Roman centurion commended by Jesus for 
his great faith.
149
 As an agent of the law, it is possible for a soldier to fulfil his duties in 
combat with the enemy, without the lust for domination.
150
 The soldier is not fighting for 
himself, but rather to uphold the law. However, this provision does not extend to the private 
citizen. A man who kills an attacker in self-defence, has no recourse to the law, for he is 
acting only out of love for himself, not that of his neighbour.
151
 Therefore, if ‘the earthly city 
observes Christian principles, even its wars will be waged with the benevolent purpose that 
better provision might be made for the defeated to live harmoniously in justice and 
godliness’.152  
The ultimate aim of every war must be peace. Augustine observed that right 
throughout nature, from the savage beasts through to all spheres of humanity, there is no-one 
that does not desire peace.
153
 ‘Even robbers, to ensure greater efficiency and security in their 
assaults on the peace of the rest of mankind, desire to preserve peace with their associates’.154 
If possible, the prevention of war through persuasion or any other peaceful means ‘are more 
glorious things than slaying men with the sword’.155 If war is unavoidable, however, one 
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should adopt the attitude of the peacemaker, who, even by fighting, through his victory may 
bring the defeated the advantages of peace.
156
 
Augustine never laid out a specific treatise on the criteria for a just war. However, his 
writings on the subject foreshadow the three ius ad bellum criteria: legitimate authority, just 
cause and right intention. Augustine’s definition of rightful authority is very similar to that of 
the Romans. Legitimate authority for war could only come from either God or the ruler of the 
state.
157
 Just cause is defined, somewhat ambiguously, as ‘those [wars] which avenge injuries, 
if some nation or state against whom one is waging war has neglected to punish a wrong 
committed by its citizens, or to return something that was wrongfully taken.’158 Upright 
intention is again in reference to the inward disposition:  
 
Love does not preclude a benevolent severity. . . . No one indeed is fit to inflict punishment save the 
one who has first overcome hate in his heart. The love of enemies admits no dispensation, but love 
does not exclude wars of mercy waged by the good.
159
  
 
As for general conduct, Augustine’s principles remained similar to those of Cicero. 
Faith must be kept with the enemy, and there should be no unnecessary violence, profanation 
of temples, looting, massacre or destruction of property.
160
 
With regard to the use of force in the service of religion, Augustine has a less clearly 
defined position. Initially, he pointed to the example of Jesus Christ, ‘who did nothing by 
force, but did everything by persuading and warning’.161 However, the continuing divisions 
between the Donatists and the Catholics in Roman North Africa, seem to have swayed his 
opinion.
162
 Formed in 311 AD after a dispute over the succession of the bishopric of 
Carthage, the Donatists established their own episcopate, one that was not recognised 
throughout the rest of the Roman Empire.
163
 Relations between the two groups were poor, 
defined by mutual hostility and distrust.
164
 To make matters worse, in Augustine’s time, 
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Donatist zealots often committed deplorable acts of violence against Catholic buildings and 
clergy.
165
 Although he maintained his belief that ‘men should be led to worship God by 
teaching, [rather] than that they should be driven to it by fear of punishment or pain’, 
Augustine did concede that many former Donatists had ‘found advantage in being first 
compelled by fear or pain’.166 Augustine argued that as the ‘lost sons’ of the Church, the 
Donatists should be compelled back in by force.
167
 Clearly though, this was an issue which 
greatly troubled Augustine, as he struggled to establish a clear position on the subject. It is 
difficult from these examples to extrapolate a general theory for the use of force in defence of 
religion, as Augustine’s argument was so closely related to one specific issue. It is debatable 
whether Augustine’s recommendations can be applied to other instances of heresy within the 
Catholic Church, let alone between other religions.  
The writings of Augustine on the subject of just war would provide the basis for 
future scholarship within the Roman Church for the next thousand years. While his influence 
within the Eastern Empire was comparatively minor, he would prove to be the single most 
influential writer from antiquity on the subject in the West. Augustine incorporated the 
philosophy of Greece, in particular Plato, the legal definitions of the Roman Empire, and the 
examples of warfare within the Old Testament, and reconciled them with the Christian 
concepts of love, mercy and charity. There were ambiguities in his writings however. He 
lacked a systematic doctrine of just war theory, and his discussions of the use of force in the 
service of religion were incomplete, allowing a wide scope for different interpretations. The 
breakdown of the Western Empire in the fifth century and the rise of Islam in the seventh 
century changed the political landscape of the Mediterranean, and led to interpretations of 
warfare within the Western Church that Augustine himself could not have foreseen.  
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Chapter Two – Just War and the Origin of the Crusades 
 
The understanding of the Augustinian concept of just war underwent a significant 
change following the fall of the Western Roman Empire in the fifth century. The worlds that 
Augustine and his medieval counterparts lived in were in many respects, radically different. 
While there were many continuities between the world of late antiquity and the early 
medieval period, such as the Roman Church itself, there had been a fundamental cultural shift 
in Western Europe. This changed culture had a significant effect on the Church itself, and had 
a major impact on the way medieval society looked at warfare. 
The traditional narrative of the development of holy war in Christendom leading up to 
the First Crusade, most famously posited by Carl Erdmann, emphasises the revolutionary role 
of the reform papacy.
168
 The Church at the turn of the millennium ‘adopted a peculiarly 
strained position toward war’, which had not been evident in Christian thought prior to that 
point.
169
 Certainly, under the leadership of popes such as Leo IX, Gregory VII and Urban II, 
the concept of holy war within the papacy was greatly expanded and developed. Yet, between 
the fall of Rome in the fifth century and the reform of the papacy in the eleventh century, the 
tradition of the Christian just war had not been completely lost. Stemming from Augustine’s 
Christian ideas and the Roman concept of just war, medieval Europe inherited a cultural 
legacy in which warfare could be seen to be applied in a meritorious manner. The collapse of 
the Roman Empire in the West resulted in the creation of a fragmented and regionalised 
society. As a result of this, conceptions of just war within Christendom became divergent and 
often simplified, but there was maintained a general acceptance of the belief that war could 
be morally justified and used as a means of attaining justice. The advent of the reform papacy 
in the eleventh century did not necessarily alter the concept of just war within the Church, but 
rather attempted to direct the waging of warfare under the authority of the papacy. Only 
under the guidance of the Church could warfare be conducted in the service of God. 
 
The Transition from Roman to Medieval 
 
The Roman world that Augustine had inhabited at the beginning of the fifth century, 
was to contemporary eyes, still a formidable and impressive empire. While the Empire had 
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faced considerable turmoil due to the incursions of the Germanic tribes to the north, there was 
no clear indication that the fall of Rome was in any way inevitable.
170
 While Rome had 
certainly changed in the four hundred years since it had become an empire, all of its central 
institutions remained intact and functional. At its centre, the emperor remained the head of 
state. While no longer considered to be divine himself, as the protector of the Roman Church 
he was still seen as divinely appointed and inspired by God.
171
 Rome maintained a massive 
army, controlled a huge trade network, and was administered by a large bureaucracy drawn 
from the upper classes of Roman society. Underpinning all these institutions was an effective 
taxation system, which was gathered together from Syria in the East all the way to Britannia 
in the West.   
For the Roman imperial machine to be able to undertake all of its critical functions, 
there needed to be some way of paying for all of it. Taxation was the financial base that the 
entire Roman system relied upon.
172
 Taxes in the empire were comparatively high for a 
predominately agrarian society, but were necessary in order to fulfil the functions of 
government, in particular Rome’s huge military. Roman imperial revenue was predominately 
gathered in the form of a land tax, based on acreage. While there was no doubt plenty of 
corruption and evasion of tax within the empire, on the whole the system was relatively 
efficient and ensured a steady flow of revenue. Without it, the empire would simply not be 
able function and fulfil its duties adequately.
173
 The vast majority of the revenue gathered by 
the Roman bureaucracy went towards the upkeep of Rome’s military. While administration 
was primarily the domain of the civilian elite, the duty to protect Rome’s vast borders fell to 
the Roman army. The very existence of a full-time, professional army is what allowed in the 
first place the establishment of a civilian aristocracy.
174
  
By the fifth century the Roman Empire had become organised into two administrative 
zones with two different emperors, ruled from Milan in the West and Constantinople in the 
East. The emperors remained hugely powerful in the fourth and fifth centuries, and any 
veneer of republicanism present in the early empire had by that time well and truly 
vanished.
175
 Below the emperor, the task of governance and administration of the empire fell 
to the bureaucracy. The Roman bureaucracy consisted primarily from members of the 
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senatorial and curial classes, the self-proclaimed elites of Roman society. By 400 AD, there 
were around 6,000 senior bureaucratic functionaries operating throughout the empire.
176
 This 
civilian aristocracy was remarkably tightly-knit and homogenous throughout the Empire, as it 
had a shared system of values based around a strong literary education. More than wealth or 
political status, the Roman ruling class was defined by its culture and values. Thus, intimate 
knowledge of classical authors such as Virgil and Cicero was expected from the members of 
Rome’s political elite, and set them apart from the rest of Roman society. Roman society was 
unusual in that it was dominated politically and administratively by a civilian elite, rather 
than a military aristocracy.
177
 Although Rome maintained a very impressive military force, it 
was the civil society that established and supported imperial power.
178
 The nature of this 
relationship affected the way Roman society viewed war and peace, and the role that the 
military played within it. In the Graeco-Roman tradition, peace did not simply mean the 
absence of war, but was related to the order and well-being of society as a whole.
179
 In this 
context, the functions of the Roman military were, as James Turner Johnson puts it: ‘in 
principle, determined by the need of the larger society to maintain its own internal peace with 
order and justice’.180 This relationship between the civil and the military would change 
drastically with the fall of the Western Empire. 
The collapse of the Western Roman Empire in the fifth century would have a major 
effect on almost every aspect of life in the post-Roman West. Political structures would be 
changed, through the creation of a number of smaller regional polities in place of the Roman 
Empire. Social structures would change, through a strong urban to rural drift and a 
militarisation of civilian elites. Economies would simplify, through smaller and more 
localised trading networks, and a less sophisticated tax system. All these changes would 
affect the culture and values of early medieval Europe, transforming it into a society very 
different from the world Augustine had inhabited at the beginning of the fifth century, and 
whose experience and attitudes towards war would be much different. 
Perhaps the most obvious change that occurred following the fall of Rome was the 
changed political landscape of Europe. Over the course of the fifth and sixth centuries, the 
formation a collection of new states and polities occurred throughout what had been the old 
Western Empire. Tribal groups such as the Goths, Franks, Vandals, and Saxons all carved out 
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for themselves kingdoms throughout the Western Empire.
181
 The removal of imperial 
authority led to a period of political decentralisation and a growing sense of regionalism 
throughout Western Europe. In contrast to the old empire, travel and trade throughout the 
regions of Western Europe became much more difficult from the sixth century onwards. The 
lack of a central administration and overriding ‘Roman’ culture in these areas stifled the flow 
of information and material goods across borders. In these new polities, both internal 
economies and wider economic networks were simplified considerably.
182
 These changes 
created a society which was less stable, less wealthy, and less educated. In such an 
environment, any further development of Augustine’s just war principles would prove 
extremely difficult. 
Aristocratic society was undergoing a period of transition at this time as well. 
Traditionally, Roman aristocratic society had been defined by its civilian, literary culture, and 
had performed the key political and administrative functions of the empire. However, the 
aristocracies of the newly formed Germanic states were almost exclusively military, borne 
out of a society where warfare was the norm. Due in part to their close proximity to Rome, 
the Celtic and Germanic peoples of Europe had drifted away from the tradition of 
government by hereditary, sacral kings, in favour of warrior leaders who were chosen 
primarily for their fighting and leadership abilities. Victory in battle conferred legitimacy on 
a leader, and thus the constitutional integrity of these societies depended on successful war 
and conquest.
183
 When these new elites settled within the empire and began to acquire lands 
of their own, they precipitated a shift from administrations based on tax collections, to ones 
which acquired their wealth from private rents derived from landowning.
184
 In these new 
states, professional armies were replaced to a degree by volunteer armies drawn from this 
ruling military aristocracy. Over time, these changes would eventually render the old Roman 
aristocracy obsolete. Without a professional army devoted to purely military matters and a 
vastly simplified bureaucracy, the surviving Roman elites faced the option of adapting to 
meet the realities of the new system or else face irrelevance.
185
 By the eighth century, any 
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vestiges of the old Roman aristocratic elite had been absorbed into the Frankish or Gothic 
military aristocracy.  
The impact of this transition should not be underestimated. While Roman society kept 
a reasonably strict division between civil and military society, the societies that emerged in 
the post-Roman world knew of no such distinction. While in Roman society, the military was 
one profession amongst many in the empire, almost every adult male within Germanic tribal 
society was expected to be a warrior and fight when the time came.
186
 There was no real 
distinction between warrior and civilian, and so the fate of the entire tribe was far more 
intimately tied to the process of war and violence.
187
 While within the Roman Empire, peace 
was understood as referring to a state of civil well-being, in Germanic tribal society it was 
understood more in the absence of threats from outside of the tribe.
188
 In addition to this, the 
militarisation of the aristocracy brought with it a different set of cultural values. The highly 
masculine values of the war-band become predominant in early medieval society, highly-
prizing such characters as honour, bravery, loyalty and courage on the battlefield.
189
 Even 
when converted to Christianity, these military aristocracies maintained their love of war and 
the values identified with its pursuit, interpreting the Christian faith through the imagery of 
the war-band.
190
  
While many structures and institutions fell with the collapse of the Roman Empire, 
the Western Church remained strong and even grew in the post-Roman world. While the 
administrative structures of the Church in the West remained stable, the collapse of central 
authority would result in a number of unforeseen consequences for the Latin Church. While 
Christianity continued to grow throughout the early medieval period, it became far more 
regionalised and diverse than it had been under the old Roman Empire. This fragmentation 
would have an adverse affect on the development of theology in the early medieval West, and 
would also impede the development of just war theory. However, by this time, the Church 
was the only remaining centre of intellectual development in the West. 
While the fall of the Western Empire precipitated the collapse of a number of key 
Roman administrative and social institutions, it did not have the same effect on the structure 
and administration of Roman Christianity. For the most part, the structures and hierarchies of 
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the Western Church, which were based on Roman imperial structures, would survive.
191
 By 
the fifth century, Christianity had been firmly established as the predominant religion 
throughout most of the Empire. Only in the more marginal areas of the Empire did 
Christianity recede when Roman imperial authority disappeared.
192
  A key to the survival of 
Christianity in the early medieval period was its organisational structure. By the fifth century, 
there was within the Church a fairly standard form of organisation. Regional dioceses were 
supervised by a bishop who in turn had jurisdiction over a number of priests who served local 
churches. While the Pope was widely acknowledged as the head of Western Christianity, 
monasteries and new dioceses could be established without papal authorisation. In this way, 
Christian modes of organisation were not so dependent on central authority and could be 
easily replicated everywhere.
193
  Because of this flexibility, Christianity not only held its own 
in the former territories of the Roman Empire, but began to expand actively to regions and 
peoples which had never been under Roman authority at all. During the early medieval 
period, the pagan Anglo-Saxons, Franks and Irish were introduced to Christianity, and 
eventually gained support and patronage from the upper classes of each society.
194
  
While the structures of the Western Church remained fairly stable at the grassroots 
level, the Church was nonetheless impacted by the growing decentralisation and regionalism 
of the early medieval period. While the Church of Rome remained the figurehead of Western 
Christianity, in practice the regional churches of Western Europe were run independently.
195
 
In the sixth and seventh centuries, the papacy looked eastward, towards Constantinople, 
rather than to its dominions in Western Europe.
196
 As a consequence, the ability of the papacy 
to legislate and enforce doctrine was substantially limited, as was its ability and inclination to 
combat heretical strains within the Western Church.
197
 Because of this, there was a major 
trend towards diversification within the various regional churches of Western Europe. 
Throughout Western Europe, there was a wide array of different Church customs and 
liturgical practices throughout the different regions. These were “micro-Christendoms” as 
described by Peter Brown, attempting to replicate the religion of Rome and recreate it in their 
own region.
198
  In practice, Western Christendom at this stage did not have a clear centre and 
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periphery, but rather was made up of ‘a loosely spread constellation of centers’.199 The lack 
of central organisation at this time adversely impacted the development of any kind of 
consistent Church position on the subject of warfare. 
The transition from Roman to medieval society would also have an effect on the role 
of the church as an intellectual centre. The decline of widespread literacy, due in part to the 
militarisation of aristocratic society, had reduced the contribution of the laity to theological 
matters.
200
 By the early medieval period, the Church had very much become the spearhead of 
intellectual thought in Western Europe, and effectively the only civilian career available to 
the aristocracies of the post-Roman kingdoms.
201
 Even within the Church though, there was 
still a relative dearth of intellectual rigour and complex theological argument. Key 
intellectual figures at this time, such as Pope Gregory I (590-604) and Bede (672-735), 
proved to be the exception rather than the rule.
202
 Contact between the different regions in 
Western Europe, while it did occur, was still fragmented to a large degree. As a result, 
unorthodox and even heterodox doctrines and belief sprang up with regularity at the local and 
regional level.
203
 
While there was much diversity within the Western Church at this stage, there were 
also common ties that bound them together. Hand-in hand with the growth of the Church as 
the intellectual heart of Christendom, was the entrenchment of Latin as the language of law, 
government and religion. In many parts of Europe where new regimes were formed in the old 
Roman heartlands, the new barbarian rulers attempted to incorporate Roman administrative 
structures, symbolism and imagery, and legal systems into their new kingdoms.
204
 Rulers 
such as the Ostrogoth Theodoric the Great, attempted to portray themselves in the manner of 
Roman emperors to their new subjects in order to prove their legitimacy.
205
 It was in the 
Church however, that Latin would be entrenched as the sacred language of Western 
Christianity. By the seventh century, the Bible was almost exclusively read in Latin in 
Western Europe, with the Greek, Hebrew and Aramaic versions having been effectively 
discarded.
206
 When Isidore of Seville (d.636) proclaimed that Latin was on the same level as 
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Hebrew and Greek ‘he was in effect recognizing its actual dominance in West.’207 While 
Roman government had collapsed in the fifth century, the Latin language would continue to 
shape Western theology throughout the medieval period. 
 
Early Medieval Attitudes Towards warfare 
 
Attitudes towards warfare in the early medieval period reflect the often fragmented 
and regionalised state of society in Western Europe at the time. Theories of just war are often 
ill-defined, if present at all, and lack the subtleties of Augustine’s thought. Moreover, during 
this period it is not possible to discern a consistent theological position held by the Church or 
the papacy with regard to the subject of warfare. As well as traditional Christian and Roman 
interpretations of warfare, a number of Germanic traditions make an impression on the way 
early medieval Europeans understood warfare. What remains consistent throughout this 
period though, leading up to the reform movement of the eleventh century, is the general 
view of the necessity and the permissibility of war. This belief is often expressed in different 
ways, but remains linked to the Roman legal definition of just war. 
At the beginning of the medieval period, the concept of just war was understood in a 
fairly rudimentary fashion, as opposed to the nuanced view expressed by Augustine at the 
beginning of the fourth century. The change in attitudes towards war can be explained to a 
degree by the changed nature of society in Western Europe after the fall of the Roman 
Empire. During the early medieval period, Christianity and the Germanic warrior culture 
were engaged in a symbiotic relationship.
208
 While Germanic culture had been Christianised 
and re-oriented religiously, Christianity could not avoid the saturating influence of the 
Germanic warrior culture.
209
 As we have already seen, post-Roman Europe was dominated by 
military aristocracies whose very identity was tied up in the pursuit of warfare. Violence was 
a way of life for much of Europe’s laity, and this culture which glorified violence “demanded 
an aggressive religion”.210 The Church, whose upper clergy often originated in these same 
aristocratic families, would not have been immune to the influence of the martial values of 
this society.  
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The changed intellectual landscape of early medieval Europe can also explain to a 
degree the changing attitudes towards warfare. The disappearance of the old civilian 
aristocracy, combined with the fragmentation of the empire, had reduced both the numbers of 
people participating in intellectual debate and had restricted their contact with each other. The 
Church, while it had become the new haven of intellectual study and learning, still suffered 
through a lack of good scholars and centres of learning.
211
 The result of these changes is that 
interpretations and understanding of just war, where they exist at all, lack the refinement 
present in Augustine’s thought.  An example of this simplified understanding of war can be 
found in the fifth century letter Gravi de Pugna, a spurious work attributed to St 
Augustine.
212
 The author of Gravi de Pugna explains just war in a deterministic manner, very 
similar to the Germanic legal principle of trial by ordeal, whereby a defendant’s guilt or 
innocence is proven by the result of an imposed ordeal. The author asserts that God is on the 
side of the righteous, and his support is necessary for victory. As with the trial by ordeal, 
victory or defeat in battle is indicative of the justness of the cause and the evidence of divine 
assistance.
213
 This view of war is held in stark contrast to that of Augustine, who believed 
while war could be fought in a just cause, the outcome of war was decided by providence and 
did not necessarily favour the side with the more just cause. Indeed, Augustine’s City of God 
was written in no small part to explain the defeats suffered by the Christian Roman Empire at 
the hands of the barbarian invaders.
214
  
The deterministic views espoused by the author of Gravis de Pugna would however 
continue to have resonance well into the medieval period, echoed even into the twelfth 
century by writers such as Bernard of Clairvaux (1090-1153).
215
 Another example of this 
conception of the just war can be found in the eighth century account of St Bede, in reference 
to the battle between the Anglo-Saxon King Oswald and the British King Cadwallon in AD 
634.
216
 Throughout the account, the role of Providence and evidence of divine sanction are 
shown to be at work. Before the battle, Oswald sets up an image of the cross on the battlefield 
and leads his entire army in prayer before the battle, beseeching God to grant them victory 
“for He knows we are fighting in a just cause”.217 The subsequent victory of the Anglo-
                                                          
211
 Wickham, The Inheritance of Rome, pp. 170-174 
212
 Russell, The Just War in the Middle Ages, p. 26 
213
 Ibid., p. 26 
214
 Augustine, City of God, 1.1-1.2, pp. 4-5 
215
 Ibid., p. 37 
216
 Bede, The Ecclesiastical History of the English People, Judith McClure and Roger Collins (eds) (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 111-112 
217
 Ibid., p. 111 
 44 
Saxons is attributed to their faith in God, and is confirmed by an outbreak of miracles that 
occur at the site of the battle itself.
218
 As with the author of Gravi de Pugna, victory is seen 
by Bede as a vindication of faith and the confirmation of a just cause.  
Not all interpretations of warfare were so strongly religious in tone however. Bishop 
Isidore of Seville (d.636) attempted to define just war in his encyclopaedic Etymologiarum 
sive Originum Libre in very secular terms. Isidore followed a very basic Roman approach to 
war, whereby a just war is defined by a formal declaration to recover lost goods or to punish 
and repel enemies.
219
 Unjust wars are waged out of madness and without legitimate cause. 
Not only does this definition of war fail to adequately reflect Augustinian or Germanic 
tradition, it is also far less sophisticated than the criteria provided by Cicero over 600 years 
earlier.
220
 Isidore’s understanding of the just war, alongside those of Bede, illustrate the 
simplification of the concept and its divergent interpretations during the early medieval 
period. As well as this though, it shows the durability of the Roman legal definition of the 
just war and its impact on early medieval thinking.  
 
Papal Attitudes towards Warfare 
 
Papal attitudes towards warfare during the early medieval period are far too varied to 
attempt to give a singular definition. In the 500 years between the papacy of Gregory the 
Great and the reforms instituted by Leo IX, the papacy evolved in ways that could not have 
been foreseen.  During this time period, there would be a fundamental re-orientation of the 
papacy and its role, which would in turn affect the papacy’s stance on warfare. 
From the fifth century to the eighth century, the papacy underwent a slow process of 
re-orientation, with its political and theological sphere of influence shifting from the East to 
the West. Following the Byzantine Emperor Justinian’s reconquest of Italy in 533, the papacy 
oriented itself towards Constantinople in the East.
221
 The papacy was closely aligned with 
Eastern Christianity, and between the years 678 and 752, no less than eleven of the thirteen 
popes were Greek or Syrian by birth.
222
 The perception of the papacy in Constantinople and 
the East differed greatly from that of the peoples in Gaul and Northern Europe. In the East, 
the pope was seen predominately as a source of theological authority. The bishop of Rome 
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was viewed amongst the ecclesiastical hierarchy as a “judge among bishops”, who held 
perhaps the most exalted position within the Church.
223
 Within the West however, the pope 
was seen in a far more reverent light. As the bishop of Rome, the pope was seen as the direct 
successor of St Peter, holding the keys to the gates of Heaven in a very literal manner.
224
 
Over the course of the sixth and seventh centuries, events such as the Lombard invasion of 
Italy and the emergence of Islamic power in the East would reduce the direct influence of 
Constantinople over Roman affairs.
225
 While still part of the Empire, the papacy increasingly 
had to rely on itself to protect Rome and its surrounds. The coronation of the Frankish ruler 
Pippin III in 754 would mark a new era for the papacy, in which its allegiance was tied to the 
fortunes of the Frankish kingdom in the West, rather than the Roman Empire in the East.
226
 
Gregory I (590-604) is an exemplar of the changing position of the papacy in the early 
medieval period. As the bishop of Rome, Gregory was highly involved in the political 
organisation of Rome in the sixth century. Faced with the threat from the Lombards in the 
north, Gregory became a pivotal player in negotiations with them and for the defence of the 
city of Rome itself. However, the role played by Gregory was forced more by necessity than 
out of political ambition.
227
 Indeed, his political role as bishop of Rome was comparable to 
that of the bishops in most other major western cities at the time.
228
  Gregory’s actions as a 
political player were necessitated in part by the lack of any tangible presence of Byzantine 
power in central and northern Italy. Despite his often unilateral actions, Gregory still saw 
himself as a loyal subject of the Roman Empire. The issue of papal primacy in the sixth 
century was still at that time, an issue of theological rather than political primacy. In regards 
to the prosecution of war, Gregory did not believe he had legitimate military authority as a 
cleric. However, he did consider that rulers with the proper authority could count on divine 
aid in performing military tasks at the behest of the clergy.
229
  
Attitudes towards war amongst the popes after their re-alignment to the West remain 
somewhat divergent, and there is a lack of a unified doctrine pertaining to just war. However, 
there is evidence that the papacy condoned and even at times participated in warfare in the 
centuries leading up to the advent of the reform papacy, foreshadowing similar proclamations 
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that would be made in the eleventh century. During the ninth century, there are a number of 
accounts from different popes in support of war against non-Christians. Popes Leo IV (847-
55) and John II (878) both write letters absolving soldiers who died in battle against pagans 
of their sins.
230
 John II writes: 
 
You have modestly expressed a desire to know whether those who have recently died in war, fighting 
in the defence of the church of God and for the preservation of the Christian religion and of the state, or 
those who may in the future fall in the same cause, may obtain indulgence for their sins. We 
confidently reply that those who, out of love to the Christian religion, shall die in battle fighting 
bravely against pagans or unbelievers, shall receive eternal life.
231
 
 
In this statement there are contained two of the elements of Augustine’s conception of 
just war: just cause and right intent. Just cause is defined in this context by the defence of the 
church and the preservation of the Christian religion, while rightful intention is expressed by 
those who fight ‘out of love to the Christian religion’.232 Nicholas I (858-867) and Hadrian II 
(867-872) stress that while warfare should not take place amongst Christians, it is permissible 
to fight against pagans.
233
 Following on into the tenth century, there are numerous examples 
of popes living and dying by the sword. Pope John X, John XII and Sylvester II all actively 
took part in military campaigns, while John VIII, Stephen VI, Benedict VI and John XIV 
were all murdered during their pontificates.
234
  While Papal attitudes towards warfare during 
this period are still divergent, they are united by the general acceptance of warfare as a 
positive means to achieve the ends of the papacy. 
 
Carolingian Approaches towards Warfare 
 
The Carolingian Empire of the eighth and ninth centuries would also provide their 
own unique approach to the subject of Christian warfare. The Carolingian dynasty came into 
being out of the dissolution of the old Frankish Merovingian dynasty.
235
 Founded by Charles 
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Martel in the late seventh century, the authority of the Carolingians in Francia was formally 
recognised by the crowning of Pippin by Pope Stephen II in 754.
236
 The apex of the 
Carolingian empire was achieved under the leadership of Charlemagne who ruled from 768-
814. Charlemagne’s empire oversaw the conquests of the Saxons, Avars, and Lombards 
amongst others, and for the first time since the fall of the Roman Empire, a significant 
proportion of Western Europe was united under a single ruler. Charlemagne’s rule was not 
notable solely for his military expansion however. Rather, the Carolingian Empire was 
unique for its time in the way it attempted to radically transform Frankish culture.  
The re-orientation of Carolingian society that took place under the leadership of 
Charlemagne, renovatio, was at its core religious in nature. This was not a transformation 
akin to the Italian Renaissance of the fifteenth century, but rather an institutional movement 
designed to shape the character of Frankish society to adhere to Christian norms.
237
 While 
theocracy may be a somewhat misleading description of Charlemagne’s dominion, the 
Christian religion was very much at the centre of Carolingian politics. This idea manifested 
itself in Carolingian society in two distinct ways; the conception of the Franks as a unitary 
society, and the intellectual revival that took place within it during the late eighth century.   
The Frankish concept of the unitary society is based very much on Old Testament 
biblical principles.
238
 Just as Israel presented itself to the gentiles as a ‘holy nation’, so too 
had the Franks ceased to be simply the populus Francorum, but now envisaged themselves as 
the populus Dei.
239
 The subjects of the Carolingian Empire were conceptually no longer 
defined by tribe or ethnicity, but had been incorporated into one body, the church.
240
 In 
essence, there was no division between the clergy and the rest of society, for the entire 
Frankish nation was a part of the Church.
241
 Accompanying this notion of the Franks as a 
holy nation, was the desire to educate the population according to the biblical principles they 
had been founded on. Under the reign of Charlemagne, there underwent an intellectual 
revival on a scale as significant as any other during the medieval period.
242
 The translation 
and dissemination of literary works, particularly Christian ones, reached hitherto 
unprecedented levels during the medieval period, and significantly raised literacy levels 
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within Francia, particularly amongst the aristocracy.
243
 The nature of this revival was 
however, somewhat derivative in nature. Great deference was given towards the literature of 
the past, and most scholars did not attempt to expand upon the knowledge provided to them, 
but instead sought to systematise and disseminate it further. Despite the recovery of much of 
the ancient knowledge of the early Church, no significant original contributions to just war 
theory were made by the Carolingians.
244
 
The Carolingian concept of warfare, particularly under the leadership of 
Charlemagne, reflects, to a degree, the unitary concept of the populus Dei. Because of the 
lack of differentiation between secular and ecclesiastical society, in a sense all of 
Charlemagne’s wars were ‘holy wars’. Unlike other societies in medieval Europe, in 
Charlemagne’s empire even the clergy were obligated to participate in the military campaigns 
of the emperor.
245
 Many of the military campaigns undertaken by Charlemagne had some 
religious significance. Charlemagne’s wars against the Spanish Muslims, Saxons and Avars 
were all justified to some degree by their status as pagans.
246
 The protracted and bloody 
campaign against the Saxons was as much a war of conversion as of conquest, with defeated 
Saxon leaders forcibly converted to Christianity and pagan forms of worship outlawed.
247
 In 
addition to this, as Christopher Tyerman argues, the prayers, blessings of warriors and 
weapons, liturgies and different scales of penance conducted by the Frankish Church during 
these conflicts elevated them into holy wars.
248
 While in many ways the Carolingian 
approach to warfare differed from other approaches during the early medieval period, there 
remained a consistent belief that warfare could be used by Christians in a morally righteous 
manner. The Carolingian concept of war would not however last long. After the death of 
Charlemagne, the Empire’s growth stagnated and eventually fragmented during the ninth 
century.  
 
The Eleventh Century and the Genesis of the Crusades 
 
The events of the eleventh century would represent a turning point in the way Western 
Christians looked at the issue of warfare. It was at the end of that century that the First 
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Crusade was launched against Jerusalem, setting in motion two centuries of conflict between 
Christianity and Islam over the Holy Land. The seeds of that particular conflict were sown, 
however, in the reform movement which swept through the churches of Christendom in the 
tenth and eleventh centuries. Prior to the eleventh century, the Western attitude towards just 
war was basic and lacked any clear definition. Throughout the medieval period in Europe up 
to that point, there appears to be a general consensus that wars could be fought for in a just 
cause, based on a combination of Roman and Germanic legal concepts. By the eleventh 
century however, there was a clear effort within medieval society to define who exactly has 
the authority to wield the sword, and against whom the sword could be wielded legitimately. 
The roots of this change can be found in the ninth and tenth centuries, starting with 
the decline of Carolingian power. The weakening and ultimate breakup of the Carolingian 
Empire in Europe ushered in a fresh period of violence and instability.
249
 To add to this 
instability, the ninth century also saw the intensification of external pressures on 
Christendom, in the form of Muslim, Viking and Magyar invasion. Much of Europe’s 
coastline was subject to the attentions of raiders from both north and south, further 
contributing to the anarchic state of post-Carolingian Europe.
250
 In Western Francia, the 
situation was particularly bad. The fragmentation of political power significantly reduced the 
influence and authority of the monarchy.
251
 Instead, effective power resided within a class of 
landed aristocrats operating at the regional and local level. Without any effective central 
control present in Western Francia, Frankish society descended into a period of lawlessness 
and private feuds between warring aristocrats. 
In the absence of effective central authority in regions such as Western Francia, often 
the onus of responsibility fell upon the Church to find solutions to the problems created 
within this violent society. The ‘Peace of God’, and later the ‘Truce of God’, were examples 
of the Church attempting to solve the problem of violence in Francia which the laity 
apparently could not. While they certainly presented an innovative solution to controlling 
violence, they were by no means without precedent. In the ninth century, Carolingian missi 
offered the same promise of protection for the defenceless in society, only sanctioned by the 
king rather than the bishop.
252
 The first of these initiatives to appear was the ‘Peace of God’. 
The beginnings of the movement can be traced back to the Council of Le Puy in 975, when 
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the bishop of Anjou assembled the peasants and milites of his diocese to consult with them 
how best to keep the peace.
253
 From this meeting, a basic principle was established: that the 
milites would respect the possessions of both the Church and of the peasantry.
254
 This 
principle would provide the foundation for the ‘Peace of God’ movement as it developed in 
the eleventh century. At the proclamation of the ‘Peace of God’ in Charroux in 989, three 
prohibitions were decreed for those who carried arms: 
 
1. Anathema for violators of churches: if anyone breaks into a sacred church, or 
violently removes anything thence, unless he makes satisfaction, let him be anathema. 
2. Anathema for spoilers of the poor: if anyone robs peasants or other poor of sheep, ox, 
ass, cow, goat, or pigs, unless by the other’s fault, and if he neglect to make full reparation, let him 
be anathema. 
3. Anathema to those who assault the clergy: If anyone attacks, captures or assaults a 
priest or deacon or any clergyman, who is not carrying arms (that is, shield, sword, coat of mail 
and helmet), but quietly going on his way or remaining at home, that sacrilegious man shall be 
held to be cast forth from the holy church of God, unless he makes satisfaction, after the 
clergyman has been examined by his bishop to see if he was at fault.
255
 
 
These decrees from Charroux would form the pattern for a number of subsequent 
peace councils such as Limoges (994), Poitiers (1000, 1014), and Elne-Toulouges (1027).
256
 
Now, while the ‘Peace of God’ movement was certainly concerned with establishing and 
maintaining peace within Christendom, it should by no means be understood as a pacifist 
movement. What the ‘Peace of God’ achieved rather, was for the Church to establish 
boundaries between warfare that was considered licit and that which was illicit. As Johnson 
puts it, “in the name of the Peace of God the sword was employed to establish and maintain 
peace.”257 At the Council of Le Puy in 975, it was the Counts of Brioude and Gevaudan who 
intervened to enforce the rulings of the council on those milites within the bishop’s diocese 
who resisted.
258
 While some older interpretations have viewed the Peace of God as an attack 
on the warrior aristocracy, recent historians such as Janet Nelson and Kathleen Cushing have 
argued that the secular aristocracy often worked with the Church to contain the violence that 
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had resulted from the decline of the Carolingian Empire.
259
 Indeed, princes and other major 
aristocratic figures often played key roles in councils and peace leagues.
260
  
Another attempt to regulate violence in the eleventh century Europe was the ‘Truce of 
God’. While the ‘Peace of God’ was concerned primarily with protecting classes of people 
against violence, the ‘Truce of God’ attempted to impose a ban on all fighting for a certain 
period of time. In the earliest ‘Truce of God’, fighting was prohibited between “the ninth 
hour on Saturday until the first hour on Monday.”261 Over time at subsequent councils, these 
restrictions were increased to include large sections of the ecclesiastical calendar, including 
Christmas, Lent and some saints’ festivals. However, these restrictions were intended only to 
apply Christians fighting amongst themselves: 
 
First, we order that no Christian slay his fellow Christian. For he who kills a Christian, without doubt 
sheds the blood of Christ. If anyone unjustly kills a man, he shall pay the penalty according to law.
262
 
 
While the ‘Truce of God’ was expected to be observed by Christians, it did not 
prohibit warfare against non-Christians during periods of truce. In practice, this applied 
primarily to infidels and heretics.  
Both the ‘Peace of God’ and the ‘Truce of God’ would have a significant impact on 
the attitudes of Western Christians towards warfare. While warfare is presented as a 
lamentable situation, particularly when Christians direct their violence towards each other, it 
can also be used as a means of keeping the peace. Even though they do not make any specific 
statements about justice or the legitimacy of warfare, both the ‘Peace of God’ and ‘Truce of 
God’ lay down a set of guidelines establishing when, and against whom, war can be 
legitimately fought. In this context, warfare is presented in neutral terms. The sword is a tool, 
which can definitely be used in a sinful way, when raised against other Christians. However, 
there is also an implicit acceptance that warfare can be used for appropriate purposes. The 
sword can be used to enforce the peace against those who would seek to disrupt it, and there 
is no prohibition on warfare prescribed for those who fall outside the jurisdiction of the 
Church. These attitudes towards warfare, particularly in relation to non-Christians, would 
have a significant effect on the development of the Crusades at the end of eleventh century.   
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The eleventh century would also witness the beginning of the papal reform 
movement. In the first half of the century, there had been within Europe a clamour to reform 
the Church in a number of different areas. By the end of the eleventh century, the papacy had 
not only undergone a reform in its practices, but it had also significantly extended its power 
and influence throughout Western Europe.
263
 
The background to Church reform cannot be traced back to any one particular issue, 
but was more a result of the convergence of a number of issues which had led to a general 
dissatisfaction with the condition of the Western Church.
264
 In the early eleventh century, 
there was a strong desire amongst reformers to restore the clergy to its condition as it existed 
within the early Church, and in particular to remove the clergy from worldly interference.
265
  
To achieve this endeavour, reformers focussed primarily on the issues of simony and clerical 
marriage, as well as the removal of secular influence. The reform movement swept through 
the clergy of Europe and eventually reached the papacy by the middle of the eleventh 
century. A key figure in this process was Pope Leo IX (1049-54), described by Geoffrey 
Barraclough as ‘the real founder of papal monarchy over the church’.266 Upon his 
appointment as Pope, Leo brought with him to Rome in his entourage many of the leading 
members of the reform movement.
267
 Unlike previous popes, Leo did not become entangled 
in Roman politics, but used his position to effect change in a far wider European sense. He 
did not merely stay in Rome, but actively attended synods, issued decrees and settled disputes 
throughout France and Germany.
268
 While the primary goal of the reformers had been a 
moral reform based on issues such as simony and clerical marriage, within a Roman context, 
reform provided an opportunity to reinforce and extend the authority and influence of the 
papacy.
269
  
Gregory VII, more than any other previous pontiff, used his position to strengthen the 
authority of the papacy. Gregory’s vision went far beyond the traditional view of the papacy, 
which placed itself as the spiritual head of Christendom. Instead, based on the authority 
provided to him as the heir of St Peter, Gregory extended this view of the papacy’s dominion 
to the temporal world as well. As the vicar of St Peter, Gregory believed he had the power “to 
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confer and withhold not only heavenly rewards but also material success and military victory 
in this world”.270 Leading on from this position, Gregory attacked the role of kingship itself. 
Kings were seen by Gregory as removable officials, who while still carried a divine mandate, 
could under the authority of the pontiff be removed if they did not fulfil their duties 
properly.
271
 While Gregory did not personally succeed in fulfilling his vision of the papacy, 
his concept of the papacy as the authoritative seat of Christendom, was an idea that became 
strongly embedded within the papacy during the rest of the medieval period.
272
 By the end of 
the eleventh century under the leadership of Urban II, the papacy’s stature and influence 
within Christendom had grown to the point where it could inspire and direct the military 
forces of Europe in a holy war for the liberation of Jerusalem, the First Crusade of 1096. 
 
Holy War 
 
The First Crusade, preached by Pope Urban II in 1095 and launched in 1096, 
represented a landmark in medieval history. The Crusades were unique in the way they were 
motivated primarily by religious reasons and also in the way that they caught the imagination 
of the people of Christendom. They did not appear, however, without precedents from earlier 
in the medieval period. As revolutionary as the impact and consequences of the Crusades 
were, the ideas behind them were innovative rather than original. The First Crusade 
incorporated elements of holy war, just war, penance and pilgrimage. Over the course of the 
late eleventh century and beyond, these elements would be brought together to fashion a new 
form of Christian warfare. 
While the First Crusade was to a large extent a product of its circumstances, owing 
much to the political events of the late eleventh century, the various elements that contributed 
towards the Crusade were present in Christendom well before this time.  The issue of penance 
and military service dates back to the ninth century, where both Pope John VIII and Leo IV 
offered soldiers fighting in defence of the faith remission for their sins.
273
 Absolution of sins 
is granted to the soldiers, on condition that they are acting ‘out of love of the Christian 
religion’.274 Moving forward to the eleventh century, there is again evidence of papal 
justification and support for warfare. During the Spanish Reconquista, the siege of Barbastro 
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in 1063 attracted the support of Pope Alexander II. In his endorsement of the war against the 
Moors, Alexander granted a remission of sins for those who took part in defence of 
Christendom.
275
 Similarly, in 1053 Pope Leo IX personally led an army into battle against a 
force of Normans, while also offering remission of penance and absolution of sins.
276
  
A significant contribution to the concept of the crusade was made by Gregory VII. 
Over the course of his pontificate, Gregory sought to establish an independent army which 
would be used in the service of the papacy, the milites sancti Petri.
277
 What differentiated 
Gregory from previous popes was the source he derived for his authority. In the past, popes 
had called on the nobility for military support in the defence of the Church against the 
heathen.
278
 Gregory’s appeal, however, was based solely on his position as St Peter’s vicar. 
Knights would be bound to serve him in a feudal relationship, based on their acceptance of 
Gregory as head of the Church, and would be absolved of their sins in return.
279
 This army 
would be the agents of Gregory’s justice, using military force to overturn errant governments 
and vindicate the proprietary rights of St Peter.
280
 Throughout his pontificate, Gregory 
attempted to win support from the aristocracy of Europe by this method. His most ambitious 
plan, foreshadowing Urban’s call in 1095, was in 1074 to raise an army under the authority of 
St Peter and liberate the Christians of the East from the Seljuk Turks. As well as appealing to 
the authority of St Peter, Gregory also called on the example of Christ: ‘Because he laid 
down his life for us; and we ought to lay down our lives for the brethren’.281 While the 
expedition never gained enough support to be put into action, its ideas show their influence in 
the appeal of Urban II in 1095.
282
 
The message preached by Urban to the faithful in 1095, brought together the different 
elements that defined a Crusade. The Crusade was a just war, a holy war, a penitential 
exercise, and a pilgrimage. Above all, Urban sought to portray the Crusade as a just war. 
Throughout the 1080s, a group of scholars, including Anselm of Lucca, Ivo of Chartres and 
John of Mantua, had begun to bring together much of Augustine’s writings on warfare, 
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supplemented by papal doctrines, into an intelligible form.
283
 Urban justified the Crusade on 
the basis that it was a defensive war, fought for the liberation of a people and a place: the 
Eastern Christians suffering under the yoke of the Muslims, and for the city of Jerusalem 
itself.
284
 The Crusade was also considered to be a holy war, called by Urban by the authority 
of St Peter, fought on behalf of Christ himself.
285
 Because of its nature as a holy war, the 
Crusade could also be undertaken as a penitential exercise. Provided they are motivated:  
 
not because they desire earthly profit but only for the salvation of their souls and the liberation of the 
church, we....relieve them of all penance imposed for their sins, of which they have made genuine and 
full confession, because they have risked their lives for the love of God and their neighbour”.286 
 
 This indulgence can be understood in the sense that because the crusade was such a 
severely penitential exercise, it would provide a satisfactory penance for all previous sins 
committed.
287
 Urban’s final innovation was to combine the holy war with the idea of 
pilgrimage. Those taking part in the crusade were inducted through the motifs of the 
pilgrimage. Each crusader swore a vow to make a pilgrimage to the Holy Sepulchre, had their 
land and property placed under the protection of the Church, and had a cross sewn onto their 
garment to confirm their status as a pilgrim.
288
 The First Crusade would mark the beginning 
of a new era in Christendom, in which the papacy actively sought to authorise and direct the 
use of warfare within it.  
The First Crusade of the eleventh century, and the subsequent crusades that were 
inspired by it, are the result of the intertwining of two threads in the history of Christendom: 
the just war and the temporal aspirations of the medieval papacy. From the early medieval 
period onwards, there had been a consistent acceptance that warfare, under the right 
circumstances and conducted with the right intent, could be considered just and even 
meritorious. This concept was readily accepted within a laity whose culture was based 
heavily on martial values, but which was also generally accepted within the theological realm 
of Christendom. While these concepts were often expressed in different ways from the fifth 
to the eleventh century, their core principles remained a fundamental part of Western thought. 
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The Church reform movement of the eleventh century took the concept of just war and 
sought to wrest its prosecution from the secular realm. Just as the development of peace 
movements in the eleventh century were focussed primarily on regulating and controlling 
violence, not eliminating it, so too the Crusades were an attempt by the papacy to direct 
warfare in a manner which was both just and holy.  
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Chapter Three – Warfare in the Byzantine Empire 
 
The status of warfare within the medieval Byzantine Empire provides an interesting 
contrast to that of Western Christendom. Although it shared the same faith as the kingdoms 
of Western Europe, and suffered far more acutely from the invasions of its non-Christian 
enemies, Byzantium never engaged itself in a holy war comparable to that of the Western 
crusades. In contrast to Western Europe, the Byzantine Empire had certain theological, 
political and social constraints that prevented the development of a doctrine of holy war. 
With regard to warfare, the Eastern Church’s attitude was considerably different. Unlike the 
West, the Eastern Church did not develop at any stage a doctrine of just war, or approve of 
the concept developed by St Augustine. Byzantine theologians generally held a negative view 
of warfare, which remained consistent throughout the history of the empire. This attitude was 
prevalent throughout Byzantine society and even within the military establishment itself, 
where generals sought to limit the negative effects of warfare and avoid it when possible. In 
addition, the power of the religious establishment in Byzantium was checked far more 
strongly within the empire. Unlike the Western Church, it lacked any real authority over the 
temporal sphere of government.  
 
The Status of Warfare in Eastern Christian Theology 
 
The ultimate basis of both the Western and Eastern Churches’ attitudes towards 
warfare can be found in their theology. During the time of the Roman Empire, the five 
patriarchates were united both by doctrine and their location within the borders of the empire. 
Following its collapse, however, Rome and the Eastern Churches began to slowly drift apart. 
Augustine’s just war, and the conceptual framework upon which it was based, never became 
influential within the churches of the Byzantine Empire. Instead, the Eastern Church’s 
approach to the subject of war was drawn from its own theological traditions, in particular 
from the canons of St Basil of Caesarea. 
One of the most important factors behind the growing theological divergence between 
the Western and Eastern Churches, was the issue of language. Although united in doctrine, 
Rome and the churches of the West used Latin as their liturgical language, while in the 
 58 
Eastern half of the empire Greek was used.
289
 Throughout the early medieval period, the 
churches of what had been the East and West of the old Roman Empire, began to diverge in 
some of their interpretations and practical application of scripture.
290
 This divergence would 
eventually lead to a schism between the East and West in 1054, which to this day remains 
unresolved between the Roman Catholic and Orthodox Churches.
291
 Other factors, such as 
the reduced contact between East and West due to the collapse of Roman power, would also 
contribute to and exacerbate the divergence.
292
 Language would however, have a significant 
effect on the way scripture was understood and interpreted in the East and West. All 
languages possess certain idiosyncrasies which influence the interpretation of any given text. 
Ideas that can be expressed clearly in one language may be almost impossible to convey in 
another.
293
 The hallmark of Latin is its logical precision and efficiency. It is an excellent legal 
language, ideal for formulating and defining abstract terms.
294
 Greek however, with its more 
complex grammar and larger vocabulary, allows for more nuance and the expression of finer 
shades of meaning.
295
  
The effect that language can have on theology can be seen from the differing 
definitions of some basic Christian concepts. For example, even the simple term Catholic is 
understood differently between Greek and Latin speakers. The Latin understanding of the 
word Catholic corresponds to the term universal.
296
 It evokes the notions of unity and 
uniformity. However, the term Cathalon in Greek has a wider meaning: integrity, wholeness 
and harmony of diverse parts.
297
 In practice, Catholics adhere to the concept of a united 
church, with one head and conforming to the same rituals and liturgical language.
298
 In 
contrast, Orthodox Christians view the church as united in faith but comprising many 
different communities, each self-governing and independent in its administration.
299
 
Ultimately, both Eastern and Western Christianity would come to reflect the mentality of the 
languages their theologies employed. With its emphasis on the rational and the abstract, 
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Western theology would become far more systematic and legalistic than the East.
300
 Eastern 
theology is far more experimental in nature, and hesitant to identify Orthodoxy with any one 
teacher or system of theology.
301
  
The growing divergence of Eastern and Western Christianity during the medieval 
period also resulted in different perspectives on the subject of warfare. These differing 
attitudes towards warfare stem from deeper theological issues. In the Western Church, 
theological doctrines were generally presented within a legal framework. For example, in 
Catholic (and later Protestant) theology, the doctrine of atonement is presented in the form of 
a legal transaction. In this doctrine, Jesus Christ suffers death on the cross in place of 
humanity, paying the legal penalty for mankind’s sin, in order that humanity may be legally 
justified before God. In addition, Western Christianity had inherited a certain innate 
pessimism from writers such as St Augustine, about the corruption of the material world 
through original sin and the inability of mankind to overcome its depravity.
302
 Eastern 
Christianity however, took a different approach to these issues. While not denying the 
importance of atonement or the problem of sin in the world, Eastern theologians focus on the 
redemptive and sanctifying aspects of Christ’s death and resurrection, viewed through the 
conceptual lens of theosis.
303
 
Theosis is one of the most important concepts in Orthodox Christianity, and is 
essential to a proper understanding of Orthodox theology and as an extension, the role of 
warfare within that worldview. Theosis, otherwise known as deification, is the process that 
represents the goal of the Orthodox Christian, to participate in the eternal life of the Holy 
Trinity.
304
 Through the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, Christians are by grace able: 
  
to participate fully in the healing and fulfillment that the Incarnate Son of God has brought to the 
world.  All are called to embrace and be transformed by the holiness of God, to become saints.
305
 
 
 An integral part of this process as shown in the Orthodox divine liturgies is peace. 
Along with perfection, holiness and sinlessness, peace was seen as an ideal to strive toward 
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and uphold.
306
 Any activity which would either frustrate or impede a believer’s ability to 
participate in the ongoing process of deification, such as warfare, could only be seen as 
sinful.
307
  
In Orthodox theology then, killing in warfare is understood in light of the concept of 
‘involuntary sin’. Involuntary sin refers to actions which are damaging to the soul despite the 
fact they are performed without malice and out of necessity.
308
 The basis of this concept 
comes from the creation account in the book of Genesis, whereby death enters the world as 
the result of Adam’s sin. Death is therefore symptomatic of the corruption of the world and 
the alienation of man from God and neighbour.
309
 Anyone who participates in an action such 
as killing, regardless of intent or context, is participating in the work of death and as such is 
committing a spiritually damaging act.
310
 Again in contrast to the West, Eastern Christianity 
views sin and repentance in a slightly different light. Rather than looking at repentance as the 
obligation to pay a legal penalty for one’s sins, Eastern Christianity views repentance in a 
restorative context, whereby the sinner is healed by reorienting their life towards God. A 
soldier who kills in battle needs to be cleansed, not so much because he has broken a law, but 
because the act of killing is spiritually damaging.
311
 In this context, it is difficult to conceive 
of a theory of just war similar to that of St Augustine, as killing is regarded as inherently evil, 
and cannot be justified even through right intent.  
Amongst contemporary Orthodox theologians, there is a general consensus that 
Eastern Christianity never fully developed a doctrine of just war equivalent to that which 
developed in the West over the course of the medieval period.
312
 Two leading twentieth-
century Orthodox theologians, Olivier Clement and Stanley Harakas, have defined warfare as 
a ‘necessary evil’, which while permissible is not in the strict sense of the term 
‘justifiable’.313 John McGuckin, while not ruling out the potential necessity of warfare, 
described it as “a curse on the human race. It arises only from evil, and causes only 
wickedness. The Orthodox Church can never legitimately endorse it.
314
 The closest 
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endorsement of a ‘just’ war theory in contemporary Orthodoxy has been presented by 
Alexander Webster.
315
 Webster defines three positions in relation to war and peace: holy war, 
just war and pacifism.
316
 Holy war, of the type equivalent to the Western Crusade or Islamic 
jihad, is not considered a viable moral option for Orthodox Christians. Along with pacifism 
though, ‘justifiable’ war is seen by Webster to be accepted within the Orthodox tradition, 
citing support from patristic, canonical and hagiographical sources.
317
 Webster equates 
sources which permit warfare as in some sense also justifying it, leading to some significant 
criticism from other Orthodox scholars.
318
   
One of the most important foundations for the Eastern Christian perception of warfare 
comes from St Basil of Caesarea (330-379) in his thirteenth canon. St Basil writes:  
 
Homicide in war is not reckoned by our fathers as homicide; I presume from their wish to make 
concession to men fighting on behalf of chastity and true religion. Perhaps, however, it is well to 
counsel that those whose hands are not clean only abstain from communion for three years.
319
 
 
 This canon, although never implemented into Byzantine law, remained highly 
influential within Byzantine theological circles.
320
 This was due in no small part to Basil’s 
status within the Eastern Church, where along with Gregory Nazianzus and John Chrysostom, 
he was considered one of the “Three Holy Hierarchs” of the ancient Church.321 
The first verse of the canon: “Homicide in war is not recognised by our fathers as 
homicide”, is a reference to earlier allowances of warfare by theologians, and most likely in 
particular to St Athanasius of Alexandria (298-373).
322
 In his letter to Amun, Athanasius 
declared that:  
 
it is not right to kill, yet in war it is lawful and praiseworthy to destroy the enemy; accordingly not only 
are they who have distinguished themselves in the field worthy of great honours, but monuments are 
                                                          
315
 Alexander F.C. Webster, The Pacifist Option: The Moral Argument against War in Eastern Orthodox Moral 
Theology (San Francisco: International Scholars Publications, 1998); Alexander F.C. Webster and Darrell Cole, 
The Virtue of War: Reclaiming the Classic Christian Traditions East and West (Salisbury: Regina Orthodox 
Press, 2004) 
316
 Webster, The Pacifist Option, pp. 82-83 
317
 ibid, pp 82-89 
318
 Andrew Louth, ‘Review of: Alexander F.C. Webster and Darrell Cole, The Virtue of War: Reclaiming the 
Classic Christian Traditions East and West’, In Communion, Issue 33 (Spring 2004) 
319
 Basil, Letter 187, 187.13, p. 228 
320
 Patrick Viscuso, ‘Christian Participation in Warfare: A Byzantine View’, in George T. Dennis, Timothy S. 
Miller and John W. Nesbitt (eds.), Peace and War in Byzantium: Essays in Honor of George T. Dennis 
(Washington: Catholic University of America, 1995), p. 38 
321
 McGuckin, Patristic Theology, p. 47 
322
 Basil, Letter 187, 187.13, p. 228; McGuckin, The Orthodox Church, pp. 403-404 
 62 
put up proclaiming their achievements. So that the same act is at one time and under some 
circumstances unlawful, while under others, and at the right time, it is lawful and permissible.
323
   
 
Although Basil is certainly seeking to challenge aspects of Athanasius’ position, it is 
less clear how far apart their views actually are. In a different translation of the text, Stanley 
Harakas interprets Athanasius’ statement as one which is consistent with the concept of 
involuntary sin: “Therefore, the same thing on the one hand according to which at one time is 
not permitted, is on the other, at appropriate times permitted and is forgiven”.324 While 
deeming war “lawful and praiseworthy” in its proper context, it is still acknowledged that the 
action itself still requires forgiveness.
325
 It is also important to point out that Athanasius’ 
letter to Amun is not ostensibly about the issue of the legality of warfare. Its primary focus is 
a reply to a query by an Egyptian monk as to whether involuntary nocturnal emissions are 
deemed to be sinful.
326
 John McGuckin argues that Athanasius merely used the discussion on 
warfare as a rhetorical tool to illustrate his answer: namely that context and intent inform 
whether an action is sinful or not.
327
 In this context, Athanasius may merely be commenting 
on the common contemporary view of warfare, not explicitly defining the position of the 
Church.
328
 It would, he argues, be reading too much into the text to assume that this could 
provide the basis for a Christian conception of warfare.
329
  
In the second part of the passage, Basil admits to the necessity of war under certain 
circumstances, in this instance “to men fighting on behalf of chastity and true religion”.330 
The context in which Basil was writing referred to the small-scale raiding of Roman border 
towns by pagan tribal insurgents.
331
 Although bloodshed is seen as lamentable and sinful, it is 
necessary for the protection of the weak and defenceless and of the Christian faith. Because 
of this, Basil still prescribes an abstention from communion for three years for those who 
fight, as their “hands are not clean”.332 This ruling, although seemingly harsh, treats the 
soldier who kills in war as an involuntary sinner rather than a voluntary murderer. 
Furthermore, in the wider context of the letter, Basil’s judgement in this situation is relatively 
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lenient. Those who are judged to be involuntary murderers, that is, those agents whose 
actions are “purely unintentional, and widely removed from the purpose of the agent”, are to 
receive an eleven year abstention from communion.
333
 Women who abort their unborn 
children are to receive an eleven year sentence, while those who are convicted of a voluntary 
murder would face a sentence of twenty years. 
334
   
The authority of Basil’s thirteenth canon within the legal framework of the Byzantine 
Empire throughout its history has at times been questioned. A prime example of this involved 
a tenth-century dispute between Byzantine Emperor Nikephoras II Phokas (963-969) and 
Patriarch Polyeukos. The dispute revolved around the emperor’s attempt to “establish a law 
that those who fell during wars be honoured equally with the holy martyrs, and be celebrated 
with hymns and feastdays.”335 The Church hierarchy responded by appealing to Basil’s 
thirteenth canon by stating, “how is it possible to number with the martyrs those who fell 
during war, whom Basil the Great excluded from the Sanctified Elements for three years 
since their hand were not clean?”336 This argument led to a confession from certain bishops 
and priests present at the synod that they themselves had been involved in military 
campaigns. These individuals were subsequently either defrocked or made to leave the 
priesthood.
337
 Patrick Viscuso, in his study ‘Christian Participation in Warfare’, examines the 
fourteenth-century Byzantine canonist Matthew Blastares and his views on the authority of 
Basil’s thirteenth canon.338 Blastares defends the authority of the canon against the arguments 
of two twelfth-century canonists, John Zonaras and Theodore Balsamon. Both Zonaris and 
Balsamon argued that the thirteenth canon was not to be considered authoritative.
339
 This was 
due to the fact that the canon had never been strictly implemented but was used as counsel, 
due to its overly burdensome nature, and believed the actions of Polyeukos’ synod in the 
tenth century were motivated primarily by a wish to reduce imperial interference within the 
Church.
340
 As well as offering his historical argument, Blastares also appealed to theological 
and scriptural arguments, citing Luke 9:55, whereby even when Israel conducted wars under 
divine sanction, those who took part were required to be ritually purified. Blastares does not 
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refute the argument that the thirteenth canon was never incorporated into legislation, but 
relies on the holiness of Basil’s viewpoint to support its authority.341  
The Eastern Church’s understanding of warfare is significantly different from the 
concepts which developed in the West. War is understood in light of the concepts of theosis 
and involuntary sin. While at times it is unfortunately necessary, it is a state which is 
inherently defiling and is a frustration of the individual’s process towards theosis. Because 
Eastern theology does not place the concepts of sin and repentance within a legalistic 
framework, war cannot be considered ‘just’. This view is reflected in Basil’s canons 
concerning war. While never strictly applied in practice, Basil’s thirteenth canon represents 
an ideal which strives to uphold peace as a normative state. 
 
Social and Political Considerations 
 
Theology was of course, not the only differentiating factor between attitudes to 
warfare in the East and West. Social, political and economic factors would also help 
determine the paths that were taken. The survival of the Roman Empire in the East would 
lead to a society that was in a number of ways very different from the medieval West. The 
political relationship between the Byzantine Emperor and the Patriarch of Constantinople, the 
continuation of Roman administrative institutions and the effects of the seventh-century Arab 
invasions would provide fundamental points of distinction between the culture of Eastern and 
Western Christianity. 
One of the key political distinctions between Byzantium and the medieval West was 
the relationship between the temporal and spiritual spheres of society. While in the West, a 
clear separation between the two developed, in Byzantium the relationship between the 
imperial and the priestly was far more complex. This relationship was not an easy one to 
define. Byzantium possessed no written constitution that summarized the distribution of 
authority, nor did it have an official Byzantine political theology.
342
 In the past, Western 
scholars have sought to define the relationship between Emperor and Patriarch under the 
heading of Caesaropapism. In contrast to the situation in the West, both civil and religious 
authority was vested in the hands of one person.
343
 This gave the Roman emperor 
disproportionate authority over the Patriarch, relegating the Church effectively to a 
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‘department of state’.344 This is a view which has been challenged in recent decades, as it 
does not appear to adequately grasp the complexity of the relationship between the basileia 
and sacerdotium.
345
 The ideal relationship between emperor and the patriarch was originally 
envisioned to be a relationship defined by symphonia, harmonious cooperation.
346
 In the 
fourth century, Eusebius envisioned a system based on the Graeco-Roman and Judaeo-
Christian traditions, whereby the emperor is sovereign and provides the law, but all those 
laws must be based on Christian principles.
347
 Furthermore, while the emperor was 
considered to be divinely appointed, this validation was understood as a conditional 
arrangement.
348
 Failure to live up to these divine standards could see an emperor lose his 
legitimate right to rule, a situation not uncommon in Byzantine society.
349
 This general 
understanding of symphonia was affirmed by Justinian I in his Novels. Byzantine society was 
made up of the sacerdotium and the basileia, with the priesthood responsible for promoting 
orthodoxy, while the empire looked after temporal affairs.
350
 In addition, it was the task of the 
emperors to carry out the religious decrees put in place by the Church councils.
351
 
Throughout the history of the empire, this ideal would remain consistent, although in practice 
the relationship between the emperors and patriarchs would be defined by compromise, 
conflict and interference.  
The practical outworking of the relationship between the basileia and sacerdotium did 
not always live up to the ideals of symphonia promoted by earlier theologians and statesmen. 
Due to the lack of precise definition of the administrative roles within the empire, conflict 
and interference between the sacred and the secular was almost inevitable. Deno 
Geanakoplos, in his critique of caesaropapism, constructed a framework within which power 
was distributed between the basileia and sacerdotium.
352
 Divided into three different spheres 
were the secular realm, the external form of the Church, and its inner, esoteric form.
353
 
External refers to the organisational and administrative aspects of Church governance, while 
internal refers to the fundamentals of the Church’s beliefs, including dogma and the 
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sacraments.
354
 Two of these spheres had a relatively straightforward source of authority. The 
secular realm was effectively unchallenged as the sole domain of the emperor, and was not 
interfered with by the patriarch.
355
 Conversely, while emperors certainly did on occasion try 
to change the fundamentals of Church doctrine, such as during the Iconoclast affair, for all 
intents and purposes the Church maintained authority over its canons and sacraments.
356
 The 
main point of contention revolved around the external administration of the Church. Both 
emperor and patriarch had important functions within Church administration, but due to his 
prerogative power to be able to select and depose the patriarch at will, in theory the emperor 
could exert a disproportionate influence over that administration.
357
 The tension between 
imperial and ecclesiastical power was never fully resolved in Byzantium. Views ranged from 
regarding the emperor as above canon law to the other extreme, whereby the emperor should 
be restricted to purely secular affairs.
358
 
The nature of the relationship between the sacred and secular in the Byzantine Empire 
would have significant implications for the development of a theory of holy war. The 
Byzantine conception of temporal and spiritual authority remained fundamentally distinct 
from that which developed in the medieval West. While the papacy in the West reached a 
point where popes could claim both religious and political authority over Christendom, their 
equivalents in Constantinople never acquired (or attempted to acquire) any degree of 
authority in the secular realm. While in 1095 Urban II was able to bring together an army 
under papal authority to win back the Holy Land, no patriarch was ever in a position to 
launch a holy war based on his own independent political authority.   
The Eastern Roman Empire was not affected by the invasions and crises of the fifth 
century to anywhere near the same extent as the citizens of the Western Empire were. By 
400AD, the Eastern Empire was still a politically and financially stable entity.
359
 Despite the 
loss of many Western provinces, by the beginning of the seventh century the Eastern Empire 
was, in relative terms, powerful, politically stable and prosperous.
360
 It operated under the 
same basic economic and administrative framework that existed in the fourth- and fifth-
century empire, maintaining its fiscal structures and regional interrelationships.
361
 However, 
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over the course of the seventh century, Byzantium would face a crisis every bit as severe as 
that which faced the Western Empire during the fifth century. The first major crisis to strike 
Byzantium was the outbreak of a protracted and devastating war with Persia at the beginning 
of the century. While the Byzantines eventually came out of the conflict victorious and in a 
better state than the Persians, it severely weakened the Byzantine state.
362
 The war had been 
characterised by sweeping campaigns which penetrated deep into the enemy’s heartland, thus 
ensuring mutual devastation for both Byzantium and Persia.
363
 The resolution of that conflict 
was then followed, almost immediately, by another invasion. Under the banner of the new 
religion of Islam, the tribesmen of Arabia launched an invasion against both Byzantium and 
Persia, a development which was at the time, totally unprecedented and unexpected.
364
 By 
642, the empire had already lost Syria, Palestine and Egypt, while regions such as Anatolia 
would be systematically attacked for another century.
365
   
The most important, as well as obvious, distinction between the crisis that faced the 
Western Empire in the fifth century and the Eastern Empire in the seventh Century was the 
political outcome. While in the West the Roman imperial framework had fallen apart, the 
Eastern Empire, while significantly diminished in size, survived and would continue to 
survive in some form for another eight hundred years. While Byzantium would be forced to 
evolve and adapt as a civilisation, the identity and traditions of its citizens remained very 
much tied to the concept of Rome and the empire.
366
 While Latin had only ever been a 
language of government and administration in the East, and even then only up until the sixth 
century, the Byzantines continued to identify themselves as Romans (Romaioi) and were 
considered as such by their Muslim neighbours as well (Rum).
367
 There was no significant 
change to the conception of the emperor or his specific roles. Because of this, issues such as 
the relationship between the emperor and the patriarch remained relatively stable and 
constant throughout Byzantine history. Likewise, institutions vital to the continuation of the 
Roman state continued to exist. The army continued to function, and a system of taxation was 
maintained even during the worst periods of the seventh-century crisis.
368
 These institutions, 
along with many others, would be transformed significantly as a result of the Arab invasions. 
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However, the Byzantine world of the eighth century and beyond, was formed from the basis 
of the Roman imperial system that was present during the late Roman period.
369
 
While the events of the seventh century did not destroy Byzantine civilisation, they 
did change the way in which Byzantium functioned both politically and socially. The loss of 
the provinces of Egypt, Syria and Palestine would have far-reaching consequences for the 
empire and would ensure it never again reached the size and power that it had enjoyed during 
Justinian’s reign. The loss of these provinces was certainly damaging culturally and 
numerically.
370
 Even more damaging was the loss of Egypt as the primary grain supply for 
Constantinople. Without the surplus Egyptian grain, Constantinople could not afford to 
support its comparatively huge population.
371
 In order to cope with the new situation, many 
Byzantine institutions would undergo significant transformation. One of the most significant 
changes that resulted from the seventh-century crisis was the merging of civil and military 
administration in the provinces. The reforms of Diocletian and Constantine had established a 
rigid separation between the army and the civilian administration of a province.
372
 Provincial 
governors had no authority over troops stationed in their area, while army commanders had 
no authority over the civilian population.
373
 With almost all regions in the empire now 
vulnerable to attack, standing armies became vital to the survival of the Byzantine state.
374
 
Over the course of the eighth and ninth centuries, a system developed where the surviving 
Byzantine territories were formed into military districts, called themes.
375
 These districts were 
put under the command of a strategos, who was responsible for both the civil and military 
administration of a province.
376
 In a similar situation to what had happened in Western 
Europe, provincial civilian hierarchies were replaced by military hierarchies.
377
 Only in 
Constantinople did the civilian administration of Byzantium continue to survive.
378
  
In many ways it would appear that Byzantine society after the seventh century had 
many features in common with Western Europe. Like the West, Byzantium had suffered from 
an external crisis which had left it poorer and more militarised.
379
 The old system of the city-
based economy had declined, while military aristocracies had emerged at the expense of the 
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civilian administration in the provinces.
380
 However throughout this period, unlike Western 
Europe, Byzantium remained a highly centralised state. Its economy was undoubtedly 
weaker, yet it still retained a centralised taxation system.
381
 The military administration had 
been transformed, yet its loyalties remained tied to the emperor rather than its provincial 
aristocracy.
382
 And while Byzantine aristocracies had increasingly become military rather 
than civil, Constantinople retained a salaried, civilian bureaucracy.
383
 The invasions of the 
fifth century in Western Europe had resulted in a fragmented and regionalised society which 
was not only militarised, but was imbued with a strong martial culture. This can be attributed 
to some degree to the influx of Germanic culture into Western Europe, but was also a product 
of the breakdown of Roman imperial structures. This did not happen to the same extent in the 
Byzantine Empire. While society was to a degree militarised, the glorification of war and 
martial virtues that was so pervasive in Western Europe was not present in the Byzantine 
East.  
The social and political environment of the Byzantine Empire contributed 
significantly to the way its citizens approached warfare. In Constantinople, the roles of the 
emperor and the patriarch were considerably different from that of their counterparts in 
Western Europe. Unlike the role the papacy was to develop, the Byzantine clergy never 
gained or attempted to gain a governing role in secular affairs. Whereas the papacy got to the 
stage in the eleventh century where they could raise an army under a papal banner, the 
patriarch was always restricted in power to purely ecclesiastical matters. Furthermore, while 
in the medieval West, the collapse of Roman institutions and influx of Germanic culture 
resulted in a militarised society within which war was glorified, the Byzantine Empire did not 
share the same attitude. While the Arab invasions had brought about significant socio-
political changes, Byzantine society remained heavily centralised and did not create an 
environment in which violence was considered a great virtue.   
 
Practical Application of Warfare in Byzantium 
 
While Byzantine theologians may have viewed it in a negative manner, warfare would 
prove to be an ever-present reality throughout Byzantine history. The manner in which wars 
were fought, would however be a reflection of attitudes of the empire’s emperors and 
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generals. Byzantine attitudes towards war would also be challenged by the emergence of the 
holy war in the form of the crusade and jihad.  
The Byzantine understanding of warfare was tied closely to the concept of empire, 
and in particular to the person of the emperor himself. While after the Christianisation of the 
empire it was shown that war could be utilised for the defence and advancement of 
Christianity, it was not a necessary precondition that Rome’s wars had to be fought in the 
defence of religion.
384
 Above all, the empire’s wars were fought for the benefit of the empire 
and to bring victory to the emperor himself.
385
 This conception of warfare was similar to that 
which existed during Late Roman times.
386
 Very much representative of this imperial model 
was the Emperor Justinian (527-565). While deferential to Christianity as the official religion 
of the empire, Justinian viewed his conquests through a very traditional Roman lens, whereby 
barbarians were brought under the Roman yoke and new provinces were added to the 
empire.
387
 This was evident by the nature of the triumph in Constantinople arranged after the 
victory of his general Belisarius in Africa. The triumph itself was a throwback to a bygone 
era, as no triumph had been held in Constantinople for the two centuries of its history.
388
 
What was notable about it however, was the lack of Christian elements present in the 
procession and rituals of the triumph.
389
  
The lack of overt Christian symbolism in the military sphere had changed by the 
seventh century. The wars with Sassanid Persia during the reign of Heraclius (610-641) saw 
the introduction of a number of Christian symbols and rituals.
390
 From that time on in 
Byzantine history, there would be a noticeable liturgical element in the wars of the empire.
391
 
In contrast to the traditional Roman imperial imagery present in the Triumph of Belisarius, 
Heraclius’ own triumph after the defeat of the Persians placed religious symbolism at the 
forefront.
392
 Rather than being based around the centre of secular celebrations, the 
Hippodrome, Heraclius’ triumph was directed towards the church of the Hagia Sophia.393 For 
some historians, Heraclius’ war against Persia provides evidence enough that Byzantium was 
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capable of launching a holy war of its own.
394
 However, Nicholas Oikonomides makes the 
argument that the increased use of religious rituals before and during warfare did not amount 
to the idea of a war fought in the name of religion. Rather, divine favour was sought to ensure 
the victory of the emperor, just as it had been throughout human history.
395
 Byzantine armies 
certainly did make use of religious rituals before battle, such as prayer, Divine Liturgy and 
the Holy Communion.
396
 However, these rituals took place as standard procedure, regardless 
of the religion of the enemy, whether they were Muslim or Christian.
397
 In his study of two 
Byzantine ivories commemorating imperial victories from the tenth century, Oikonomides 
concluded that the references to imperial wars were incidental and did not provide any 
evidence of a prevailing Byzantine concept of holy war.
398
 Wars such as Heraclius’, with 
clear religious consequences, merely reflected the intensity and gravitas of the conflict, 
without fundamentally changing the approach toward war, which was fundamentally based 
around the person of the emperor.
399
 
This understanding of warfare in Byzantium is reflected by a collection of Byzantine 
military handbooks ranging from the sixth to the tenth century. These manuals, called 
strategikon, provided a practical guide to military strategy, tactics and logistics, but also offer 
some insight into attitudes towards the concept of warfare itself within the Byzantine military 
establishment. An anonymous manual from the sixth century justifies the use of arms in spite 
of their ‘evil’ nature:  
 
I know well that war is a great evil and the worst of all evils. But since our enemies clearly look upon 
the shedding of our blood as one of their basic duties and the height of virtue, and since each one must 
stand up for his own country and his own people with word, pen, and deed, we have decided to write 
about strategy.
400
  
 
Another manual from the sixth century, Maurice’s Strategikon, most likely written by 
Emperor Maurice himself, approaches the subject of war in a very serious and meticulous 
manner.
401
 The author clearly does not view warfare as a noble pursuit in and of itself, but 
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rather as a means towards furthering the goals of the state, undesirable though it may be.
402
 
War is not glorified, and there is a continuous bias against the pursuit of open warfare if at all 
possible.
403
 Victory through sheer force is advised against, as it is considered ‘ridiculous to 
try to gain a victory which is so costly and brings only empty glory’.404 Instead, the use of 
trickery, ambushes and ruses are recommended, to demoralise the enemy and prevent the 
need for open battle.
405
 Generals are even advised to leave a gap in their lines to give the 
enemy an opportunity to flee, ‘in case they judge that flight is better than remaining and 
taking their chances in battle.’406 An interesting contrast is provided in a section describing 
the tendencies and tactics of the Frankish peoples. While disparaged for their perceived lack 
of discipline and organisation, the Franks are characterised as violent, bold and impetuous on 
the battlefield, with a seemingly callous disregard for their own personal safety.
407
 While the 
Byzantine avoids war and fights only when he has to, the Frank is portrayed as actively 
seeking out combat as an opportunity to prove his value.
408
 
In addition to these, Emperor Leo VI (886-912) also produced a military manual, the 
Taktika, which commented on the merits of military enterprise.
409
 In the introduction, Leo 
states the Byzantine position on the subject of war. In the opinion of Leo, the normative state 
for humanity is one of peace.
410
 Humans cherish their own safety, and embrace peace as the 
proper way of life, if given the opportunity.
411
 The existence of war is attributable to the 
devil, who through sin entices humans to fight with each other, going against their natural 
inclination.
412
 War could therefore, only be justified when fighting against those who were 
doing the devil’s work. Defensive wars were considered legitimate as they were a response to 
unprovoked aggression.
413
 Offensive warfare, however, against those who have not been 
wronged, is considered unjust and undesirable, regardless of whether they are Christians or 
barbarians.
414
 All three of these strategika, while created for the express purpose of teaching 
generals how to win wars, do not seek to glorify the profession of warfare at all. War is 
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presented as a necessary obligation for the defence of the empire, and in Maurice’s 
Strategikon and Leo’s Taktika there are some just war ideas present. Even so, war is never 
portrayed in a positive light or as something that should be sought after. Both the anonymous 
sixth-century manual and Leo’s Taktika explicitly state that war itself is an evil, while the 
undesirable nature of war is implicitly referred to throughout Maurice’s Strategikon. 
The Byzantine attitude towards warfare can also be understood more clearly from its 
interactions with other cultures and religions. Over the course of Byzantine history, the 
empire was confronted with theories of holy war from both Western Christianity and Islam. 
The reactions of the Byzantines to the concepts of crusade and jihad help to illustrate more 
clearly the Byzantine concept of war.  
The Byzantine Empire was first introduced to the Western Christian idea of holy war 
through the medieval crusades. During the First Crusade, Byzantine forces under Emperor 
Alexius Comnenus had a number of interactions with the crusading armies that assembled in 
the capital, Constantinople. A Byzantine perspective on the crusades and on the Western 
Christians themselves has been recorded in the account of Anna Comnena in the Alexiad.
415
 
Comnena’s understanding of the motivation and justification behind the crusade was fairly 
simplistic. She understood the originator of the movement to be Peter the Hermit, who was 
commanded by a divine voice: ‘To proclaim to all the counts in France that all should depart 
from their homes, set out to worship at the Holy Shrine and with all their soul and might 
strive to liberate Jerusalem from the Agarenes’.416 Comnena does not comment on the merits, 
good or bad, of the crusade itself. Of theological issues such as the remission of sins for 
crusaders, she does not seem to have much awareness. What she does comment on, however, 
is the overall character of the Franks and their deeds. In general, Comnena held the Franks’ 
character in a fairly low estimation, noting their uncontrollable passion, erratic character and 
greed as key traits.
417
 In their deeds they were also shown to be very cruel, through their 
treatment of the population of Nicaea.
418
 The divergent attitudes toward warfare itself 
between the Latins and Byzantines are most striking in Comnena’s description of a Latin 
priest fighting alongside his soldiers.
419
 Shocked by the willingness of the Latin clergy to take 
up arms with the same hands that handle sacred objects and distribute the sacraments, 
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Comnena comes to the conclusion that the Latin race “is no less devoted to religion than to 
war”. 420 
While the crusades certainly made a significant impression on Byzantine history, the 
Islamic concept of jihad was a far more pressing concern for the empire after the emergence 
of Islam in the seventh century. During the period of initial contact between the caliphate and 
the empire, the Byzantine understanding of jihad or even Islam itself was almost non-
existent. In the account of Sophronius, Patriarch of Jerusalem, the Arabs were portrayed as 
godless or God-hating barbarians.
421
 Seemingly unaware of the fact they were preaching a 
new religion, the Arabs were seen by Sophronius as a judgement on the empire against 
heresy.
422
 Over the next few centuries, the Byzantine understanding of Islam did increase, 
although those living in close proximity to Muslim populations tended to have a far better 
understanding than those on Islam’s periphery.423 Islam was interpreted within a Christian 
framework, where it was assumed to be a heresy similar to Arianism, as it denied the divinity 
of Christ.
424
 Held almost universally by Byzantines in a very low regard, Muhammad was 
considered to be a false prophet, while the Qu’ran was described by Nicetas Byzantinos as 
‘pitiful’ and ‘inept’.425 
Byzantine scholars were almost universally opposed to the concept of jihad. As it is 
argued by Ioannas Stouraitis, Byzantine theologians rejected jihad on the basis of two of its 
core ideas: “the idea that God commanded the subjugation or annihilation of the infidel and 
the idea that the believer could gain eternal life in Heaven and become a martyr through his 
participation in divinely ordained warfare.”426 The idea that killing can be considered a 
meritorious act is repeatedly rejected in Byzantine texts. Two ninth-century theologians, 
Theophanes the Confessor and Nicetas Byzantius, dismiss the idea that warfare can be seen 
as a religious task, as God would not favour the destruction of his greatest creation, man.
427
 
Leo VI labels the Muslims as ‘impious’, as they wrongly rejoice in war, whereas God 
disperses the warmongering nations.
428
 This understanding of jihad is supported by the first-
hand account of the fourteenth-century Archbishop of Thessaloniki, Gregory Palamas. 
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Following his capture by Turkish forces of the coast of Kallipolis, Gregory expressed his 
dismay at the Muslims’ belief that violence and warfare were approved of by God:  
 
For these impious people, hated by God and infamous, boast of having got the better of the Romans by 
their love of God . . . they live by the bow, the sword and debauchery, finding pleasure in taking slaves, 
devoting themselves to murder, pillage, spoil . . . and not only do they commit these crimes, but even – 
what an aberration – they believe that God approves of them. This is what I think of them, now that I 
know precisely about their way of life.”429 
 
 Stouraitis also notes that this general antipathy towards jihad cannot be attributed 
simply to political and cultural animosity. 
430
 As the Byzantines considered Islam to be a 
heretical form of Christianity, their rejection of it was based primarily on theological and 
ideological principles.
431
 Warfare in the Byzantine Empire was carried out in a manner, if not 
always consistent with the theological ideals of Eastern Christianity, that attempted to 
minimise its destructive effects. Byzantine military strategists and tacticians were mindful of 
the sinful nature of conflict, and sought to achieve victory without resorting to battle if at all 
possible. War as a profession was a necessity within the empire, but it was not glorified as an 
end unto itself. In addition, Byzantium had to face the ideological challenge of holy war from 
both Western Christianity and Islam. While the Byzantine military did incorporate some 
Christian rituals during its campaigns, it repeatedly rejected the concept that war and the 
shedding of blood could be considered a holy religious duty. 
The Byzantine attitude towards warfare is one which is based primarily on theological 
principles. Warfare is considered to be an evil state, brought about as a consequence of 
human sin. Even when considered a necessary task in light of even less desirable alternatives, 
the act itself is still considered sinful and spiritually damaging. Within this framework, war 
cannot be fully just according to the definition of St Augustine (i.e. without sin) as the very 
act of killing in warfare is regarded as sinful, regardless of intent. This view, as a normative 
ideal, is consistent throughout Byzantine history and was vital in shaping the attitudes of the 
emperors and soldiers who were required to fight for the empire. War was an essential duty, 
but it was not actively pursued or admired as an end unto itself. This negative attitude 
towards war also prevented the development of any form of holy war akin to the crusades or 
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jihad. Indeed, jihad was rejected because of its claim that killing in battle could be regarded 
in any sense as a meritorious religious act. Additionally however, other factors need to be 
taken into account, in particular political and social considerations. Unlike the papacy in 
medieval Western Europe, the patriarchs of Constantinople did not at any stage claim 
authority over the secular rulers in the way popes such as Gregory VII and Urban II did. The 
continuity of Roman rule in Byzantium would not allow the development of patriarchal 
power along the same lines as in Western Europe. Furthermore, Byzantine society was on the 
whole, far less conducive to the glorification of martial values that typified the aristocracies 
of Western Europe. However, while these social and political factors need to be taken into 
consideration, the key underlying factor in the Byzantine attitude towards warfare is that of 
theology. By consistently defining warfare as an evil and sinful state, holy war could never be 
fully legitimised within the empire.  
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The Medieval Theory of Just War 
 
The twelfth century would mark an important period in the development of just war as 
a systematic theory. Prior to then, while the concept of just war had been understood as a 
general principle, there had been no major attempt in the West to expand upon the basic 
foundational principles as laid down by St Augustine. However, over the latter period of the 
Middle Ages, a serious effort to refine and elaborate upon Augustine’s definition of just war 
would take place. Canonists and theologians would develop a number of new formulations of 
the just war, the most well-known and influential of which is found is Thomas Aquinas’ 
Summa Theologiae. In addition to the development of just war theory, the canonists would 
also seek to define and formulate the concept of holy war, which from 1095 onwards 
manifested itself in the form of the crusades. However, in contrast to the Latin West, the 
Byzantine East would fail to either develop its own theory of just war or borrow the concept 
from its Western neighbours before its destruction in 1453.  
 
Gratian and the Decretum 
 
Up until the twelfth century, just war was a concept that, while influential, was not 
clearly defined as either a theological doctrine or a legal principle. After this period however, 
the concept of just war would begin a process of development that would result in a complex 
doctrine. The catalyst for this long period of development would owe itself to the production 
of just one book. The Concordia Discordantium Canonum (“The Harmony of Discordant 
Canons”), commonly known simply as the Decretum, was an attempt by its author to compile 
the many canons of the church into one volume and resolve the inconsistencies between 
them.
432
  The Decretum was compiled in 1140 by Gratian. Very little is known about the life 
of Gratian, and even his occupation is the subject of much speculation. Traditionally 
considered to be a Camaldolese monk, some recent scholarship has questioned this 
assumption, and there have been suggestions that Gratian may have been a bishop or even a 
lawyer.
433
 The location where the Decretum was put together is however more certain. The 
                                                          
432
 Anders Winroth, The Making of Gratian’s Decretum (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 5 
433
 Ibid, pp. 6-7 
 78 
Decretum was written in Bologna, which was in the twelfth century perhaps the leading law 
school in Europe.
434
 
In compiling the Decretum, Gratian drew upon a vast collection of texts, spanning 
from the Bible itself, through the period of the pre-Constantinian Church right up until the 
time of the book’s completion.435 These texts included papal decretals, conciliar canons, 
writings of the Church Fathers, and pieces of secular legislation.
436
 In relation to the sections 
involving the issue of warfare, Gratian drew heavily on St Augustine and Isidore of 
Seville.
437
 Indeed, Gratian was not particularly original in his consideration of just war 
theory, and deferred judgement heavily to the authorities of the past. To focus solely on this 
though, would be to miss the significance of Gratian’s contribution to the development of just 
war theory. In the opinion of F.H. Russell, Gratian’s Decretum ‘inaugurated the period of 
systematic canonical jurisprudence’.438 Whereas earlier efforts at compiling canon law from 
the Carolingian period onward had been inconsistent at best, the Decretum was the first real 
systematic compilation of canon law in medieval Europe.
439
 
The Decretum itself consists of three main parts. The first section is divided into 101 
distinctiones, which are concerned with the sources of law, the ecclesiastical hierarchy, and 
the discipline of the clergy. The second part consists of 36 causae, each divided into 
questions. The third part consists of five distinctiones and treats the remaining sacraments.
440
 
The texts which specifically refer to the matter of warfare are found in Causa 23. The Causa 
is introduced by stating a hypothetical situation in which “certain bishops have fallen into 
heresy with the people in their charge”.441  These bishops, threatening their Catholic 
neighbours to adopt their heretical position, force the Church to act and take measures to 
bring the heretics into line by force.
442
 From this starting point, Gratian poses eight questions 
relating to the use of violence in a Christian context. Because of this, the debate extends 
further than the question of whether war can be just, but also delves into such issues as 
corporal punishment and the correct treatment of heretics.  
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In quaestiones one of Causa 23, Gratian focuses on the issue of whether it is a sin to 
serve as a soldier. Providing a number of examples from Jesus in the New Testament, Gratian 
first puts forth the proposition that it appears that it is a sin to serve as a soldier.
443
 Christians 
are instructed to turn the other cheek and reserve judgement on others, leaving vengeance and 
justice for the Lord to repay.
444
 To answer these objections, Gratian follows closely the lead 
of Augustine. Paraphrasing Augustine, Gratian replies that “the precepts of patience have to 
prevail less in outward deed than in the preparation of the heart”.445 Provided that a soldier’s 
heart is peaceable while waging war, in obedience to God or a lawful authority, and not 
subject to motivations such as mischief, cruelty or greed, it is possible to wage war without 
sinning. Adhering strictly to the teachings of Augustine throughout the text, Gratian 
concludes that the occupation of soldiery is not to be considered sinful.  
The concept of righteous intent outweighing outward action in warfare is evident in 
Gratian’s writings throughout Causa 23. In quaestiones three and four, objections are again 
raised to the legitimacy of warfare. Quaestiones three raises the issue of avenging injury done 
to one’s associates, where the example of the early Church appeared to be “suffer with joy” 
any wrongs done to them, having been found worthy to bear disgrace for the sake of 
Christ.
446
 In this case, Gratian follows Ambrose of Milan in saying that those who fail to 
prevent injury against an associate (who have it in their power to prevent it) are just as 
culpable as those who inflicted the injury.
447
 Citing Exodus, Ambrose writes that Moses, 
when confronted by an Egyptian mistreating a Jew, defended the latter by striking the 
Egyptian and burying him in the sand.
448
 In the case of quaestiones four, the objection is 
raised from the Gospel that, “he who resorts to the sword shall perish by the sword”.449 This 
objection is countered by Gratian as applying to those who do not fight with legitimate 
authority and with wrong intent. Gratian then states that vengeance, as it is expressed in 
warfare, can at times be legitimate and just. Provided that this vengeance is motivated by zeal 
for justice, rather than for the sake of vengeance itself, warfare can be an appropriate method 
to correct evil deeds.
450
 Throughout both of these texts, the idea that the internal disposition 
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takes precedence over the external action is fundamental to Gratian’s understanding of 
warfare and justice.     
Having provided the reassurance that warfare itself can be pursued without sin, 
Gratian then moved on to the definition of the just war in question two. In this case, Isidore of 
Seville’s basic Roman conception of just war provides the blueprint. A just war is described 
in Canon one simply as a war “which is waged by an edict in order to regain what has been 
stolen or to repel the attack of enemies”.451 From this, Gratian ascertains that there are but 
two criteria which define the just war: formal declaration or the avenging of injustice.
452
 
Referring to Augustine’s commentary on the wars of the Israelites, Gratian uses their 
example to further nuance his own definition of just war. The use of ambushes by Joshua 
against the Canaanites gave legitimacy to the tactic, and did not affect the justice of the cause 
of war.
453
 In addition, the wars of the Israelites against the Amorites provided an example of 
a rightful cause for war. By denying the Israelites innocent passage across their territory, 
“which ought to have been granted according to the most equitable law governing human 
society”, the Amorites therefore inflicted an injustice on the Israelites that legitimated a war 
against them.
454
  
Also related to the concept of just war in Gratian’s mind was the principle of 
legitimate authority. In quaestiones five of Causa 23, Gratian answers the objection to the 
idea that all killing is prohibited as specified by the biblical commands “Thou shalt not kill” 
and “Whoever takes the sword, shall perish by the sword”.455 In answering these objections, 
Gratian makes a clear distinction between the public and private spheres. While the act of 
killing undertaken by a private citizen would in almost any context be categorised as 
homicide, Gratian makes a distinction between the actions of private individuals and those 
acting in obedience to authorities.
456
 In canon 41 of quaestiones five, Gratian takes his 
position from Augustine. Augustine judges that neither a soldier killing an enemy, or a judge 
or his minister killing a criminal would necessarily be guilty of committing a sin, as they 
were acting in obedience to a legitimate authority. As it is stated in Augustine’s Questions on 
Leviticus: ‘When a man is justly killed, it is the law, not you, who kills him.’457   
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In addition to his definition of the just war in Causa 23, Gratian also discussed a 
number of issues relating to the role of the Church in warfare. As F.H. Russell noted, 
Gratian’s just war functioned on two different levels.458  While on one level, there was 
warfare which derived from legitimate secular authority and was waged for the recovery of 
stolen goods or the avenging of injuries, there was a second level which was related to the 
concept of holy war.
459
 Quaestiones six, seven and eight of Causa 23 examined the role of the 
Church and its relationships with heretics, excommunicates and infidels. Quaestiones six and 
seven dealt primarily with the issue of heretics, whether they should be compelled back into 
the Church and whether they were allowed to retain their own property. Citing Augustine 
again, Gratian concludes that it is indeed right for Catholics to compel heretics by whatever 
means necessary.
460
 Gratian argues that the use of force is justified, as through tribulations 
and the fear of punishment, evil will fall into disuse and ‘the good becomes agreeable owing 
to habit’.461 Likewise, Catholics could rightly dispossess heretics of their property, as what 
the heretics possess, they possess without right.
462
  
Quaestiones eight of Causa 23 provided clarification on a number of issues related to 
the Church and its role in warfare. The Church definitely had a role to play, but it was a 
limited one. On the issue of the involvement of priests in warfare, there was a strong 
prohibition against them taking up arms themselves.
463
 However, this prohibition only 
extended to the physical participation of priests in warfare. In canon eight Gratian quotes 
Pope Leo IV, who states that: ‘we have to defend our flock against everybody and be its 
foremost protectors.’464 Because of this, Gratian argues that it is allowed for the prelates of 
the Church, following Leo’s example, to ‘vigorously exhort anybody to make a defence 
against the adversaries of the holy faith and to incite everybody to fend off the violence of the 
infidels.’465 
The significance of the Decretum in the development of just war theory should not be 
underestimated. Gratian’s achievement lay not particularly in the originality or innovation of 
his own ideas, but in his systematic organisation of centuries of canonical texts. In his 
treatment of warfare and in particular the concept of just war, Gratian was heavily indebted to 
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St Augustine and deferred to his judgement on most matters. In his definition of just war he 
was vague and required further elaboration. However, by bringing together and 
systematically organising Augustine’s thought on just war into a single text, Gratian would 
lay the foundation for future generations of canonists and theologians in Europe. As the 
theory of just war began to be nuanced and defined more precisely throughout the course of 
the medieval period, Gratian’s Decretum would set the parameters of discussion and provide 
the starting point upon which others would build.  
 
Just War in the Decretists and the Decretalists 
 
The compilation of the Decretum in 1140 would provide the spark that precipitated 
the development of the theory of just war in the medieval period. From roughly 1140-1190, a 
group of canon lawyers later known as the Decretists, would utilise Gratian’s Decretum as a 
starting point to refine and develop his treatment of warfare in Causa 23.
466
 In his discussions 
on warfare, Gratian had inherited from Augustine a number of general principles on the 
nature of warfare and its correct use within a Christian context. However, in his Causa 23 he 
had not come up with a clear formula expressing the theory behind the just war principle.
467
 
Throughout the second half of the twelfth century, the Decretists would attempt to define the 
theory of just war and its component parts more articulately. Issues such as just cause, 
legitimate authority, and the role of the Church in warfare would all be expanded upon by the 
Decretists. Following on from the Decretists, the thirteenth century would see a new wave of 
canonists studying the just war. As they predominately commented on papal decretals 
(authoritative statements on issues of canon law) they are commonly referred to as the 
Decretalists.
468
 The Decretalists would further refine the definitions of concepts such as 
legitimate authority and just cause, and apply them specifically within the context of 
medieval feudal political structures. Individuals such as Raymond of Penafort, Pope Innocent 
IV, and Hostiensis would prove to be influential to the growing theory of the just war. 
As was the case with Gratian, the Decretists were not highly original in their 
interpretation of the just war. Causa 23, which contained a comprehensive compilation of 
Augustine’s thought on the subject of warfare, remained the blueprint from which the 
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Decretists gained their understanding of the concept.
469
 One of the key contributions of the 
Decretists was to draw together Gratian’s various canons on warfare and attempt to develop 
new formulations of the theory of just war. The earliest effort to expand on Gratian was 
recorded in Rufinus’ Summa Decretorum.470 According to Rufinus, war could be considered 
just on three grounds: On account of the one who proclaimed the war, on account of those 
who fought it, and of the one who should be repelled by it.
471
 If on any grounds the claim was 
found to be lacking, it would be considered an unjust war.
472
 Russell points out that this 
definition was “schematic rather than descriptive”, invoking general principles but not 
specifying any particular institutions.
473
 The Decretists’ understanding of just war theory was 
not so much legal or canonical as it was theological and moral.
474
 Without a clear distinction 
between what was legal and what was moral, the Decretists’ formulations concerning warfare 
were equally as applicable to contexts such as rebellion, police action and intra-familial 
feuding as they were to public warfare. Though they were presented in different formulations, 
common to almost all the theories of the Decretists were the concepts of legitimate authority 
and just cause.   
For the Decretists, the concept of just cause in warfare was closely related to the 
defence against violence and injustice. In general, the Decretists were in agreement that the 
necessity of defence justified the use of armed force to retaliate.
475
 However, they lacked a 
clear distinction between the repulsion of violence in general, and the repulsion of violence 
specific to warfare.
476
 To clarify this particular distinction, the Decretists were forced to 
emphasise the necessity for legitimate authority to prevent unrestrained private warfare.
477
 As 
well as the necessity of just cause, the presence of a legitimate authority was also commonly 
held by the Decretists to wage a just war. While Rufinus’ Summa Decretorum did not specify 
the nature of the authority that could wage the just war, the author of the Summa Parisiensis, 
Sicard of Cremona, and Huguccio stated that the legitimate authority to declare war resided 
with princes or princely authority (potestas principis).
478
 What exactly constituted princely 
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authority is more difficult to define, but at least the identification of ‘princes’ with just war is 
an indication that public authority was a necessary component in the waging of a just war.    
The thirteenth century Decretalists would further build on the work of the Decretists 
in developing the theory of just war, both in its formulation and definitions. In the early 
thirteenth century Laurentius Hispanus would provide a set of criteria which would be 
adopted into common use by a number of Decretalists. These criteria were divided into 
persona, res, causa, animas and auctoritas.
479
 Raymond of Penafort’s treatment of the just 
war adopted Laurentius’ formula with modifications. Persona specified the type of person 
who was able to fight in a war. For a war to be just, it had to be fought by secular persons, 
with clerics being prohibited from fighting unless under necessity.
480
 Res referred to the 
object, which must be the recovery of property and the defence of the patria.
481
 Causa 
specified the cause of the war, which had to be fought out of necessity and to achieve 
peace.
482
 Animus was understood as the state of mind with which combatants entered the war. 
War had to be fought out of piety, justice and obedience, while motives such as hatred 
revenge or greed were condemned.
483
 Finally, authority (auctoritas) to declare war resided 
with either the Church or the ‘prince’.484 
A second kind of formulation was constructed by Hostiensis, who instead came up 
with a list of seven different kinds of wars: Roman, Judicial, Presumptuous, Licit, 
Temerarious, Voluntary and Necessary.
485
 Of these, Roman, Judicial, Licit and Necessary 
wars were considered just, and were differentiated by the nature of the enemy and the source 
of authority. A Roman war, for instance, occurred between believer and infidels and was 
considered just because of the nature of the enemy, while a judicial war was fought between 
believers with one side fighting under the authority of a judge.
486
 Presumptuous, Temerarious 
and Voluntary wars were however categorised as unjust, and were often directly related to 
one of the types of just war. For example, Presumptuous wars were fought by believers 
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(against other believers) who were obstinately opposed to a judge, the opposite of the 
Judicial war.
487
 
Definitions of certain concepts were more thoroughly explained by the Decretalists 
than their predecessors. One of these definitions involved the right to self-defence as a just 
cause for war. While the Decretists had shied away from attempting to resolve the issue of 
the legitimacy of violent self-defence, the Decretalists made a more thorough effort to define 
the issue.
488
 The Decretalists took much of their position from the Roman law dictum that 
violence could be repelled by violence, and attempted to harmonise it with their 
understanding of Gratian.
489
 Raymond of Penafort stated that even without the special 
authority of the prince or the Church, it was permitted by law for anyone to “repel force with 
force, immediately (in continenti), and with the moderation of blameless defence”.490  
Raymond stressed that the reaction to any attack should be moderate and proportionate to 
what was inflicted.
491
 Hostiensis was more lenient in his interpretation, stating that any injury 
inflicted upon an assailant by the victim in self-defence would not be held against him.
492
 An 
important contribution was made by Innocent IV who, in the context of self-defence, 
differentiated between the terms war (bellum) and defence (defensio).
493
 Because of this 
distinction, it would then be permissible for anyone to defend themselves or their property 
against attack without the authority of a prince, as they are not engaged in a just war but 
rather a justified right to private self-defence.
494
  
The Decretalists further elaborated upon and defined what constituted a legitimate 
temporal authority to declare war than the Decretists had. Under the Decretists, legitimate 
authority to declare war was to be found in the Church and the authority of the prince 
(potestas principes). The Decretalists would expand on this rather vague definition to fit the 
realities of thirteenth-century European society. To determine exactly who within the 
temporal sphere had the requisite authority to make war, some of the Decretalists attempted 
to establish a structural hierarchy of princes equivalent to that of the Church.
495
 While Europe 
functioned politically under a feudal general framework, large monarchies like France and 
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small Italian city-states were quite different in terms of their political independence and 
prestige.
496
 Because of this, distinctions between levels of political authority were arbitrary 
and often disputed.  
The most contentious division for the Decretalists in this issue, resided between the 
authority of princes against the authority of the western Emperor. At one end of the spectrum, 
Hostiensis declared that only the emperor had the authority to declare just wars, and 
explicitly condemned all wars between Christian rulers, which were of course during this 
time very common.
497
 As the rulers of Europe were bound by kinship as the ‘Roman People’, 
any war between them was considered unjust. This did not entirely rule out the possibility 
that Christian rulers could make war against each other, as in the case of a judicial war, which 
was undertaken by believers against other believers at the behest of an authoritative 
judgement.
498
 In contrast, a perhaps more balanced view of legitimate authority was 
developed by Innocent IV. In Innocent’s formulation, war could be declared by a ruler who 
did not have a superior.
499
 Any war then could only be directed against those who fall outside 
of his own jurisdiction, while those within his jurisdiction he could not declare war on but 
would be subject to, his judgement.
500
 In his commentary on just war, William of Rennes 
took Innocent’s concept and expanded upon it.  According to William, a ruler who has no 
superior – whether a king or the emperor – may on his own authority wage war against 
foreigners if he has a just cause.
501
 In addition, he may also grant subordinates the right to 
wage war on his behalf. However, he may not wage war against his subordinates, provided 
the perpetrator is willing to undergo judgement by trial. If not, the ruler then has the authority 
to wage war against him.
502
  
In comparison to the canonists, the theologians of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, 
prior to Thomas Aquinas, did not contribute anything particularly original to the theory of 
just war. If anything, they were even more reliant on Gratian’s Decretum than the canonists, 
who by the thirteenth century were also making use of papal decretals in their formulations. 
They continued to see just war primarily in moral terms, where it served as a punitive 
measure against sin. Alexander of Hales provides a reasonable representation of theological 
thought at the time. In a similar fashion to the canonists, Alexander provides a set of five 
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criteria to distinguish between a just and an unjust war: authority (auctoritatem), state of 
mind (affectum), intention (intentionem), condition (conditonem), desert (meritum) and cause 
(causam).
503
 Where Alexander in particular differed from the canonists was his attitude to 
private self-defence. Following Augustine, Alexander distinguished his position by stating 
that private self-defence was not a justifiable grounds for war. 
The twelfth and thirteenth century canonists took the Augustinian view on just war as 
it was presented in the Decretum, and over a period of two centuries gradually developed a 
more complex formulation of the just war. While they did not stray far from the general 
principles espoused by St Augustine, they made the attempt to extrapolate those principles 
into a set of more precise legal definitions. Through the work of the Decretalists, definitions 
of just cause and legitimate authority were developed within the context of a feudal political 
hierarchy. By the end of the twelfth century, the theory of just war had begun to move away 
from a purely moral framework of sin and punishment, to one which was viewed more as a 
legal and judicial process.  
 
Holy War and its Relationship with Medieval Just war Theory 
 
The systematic development of just war theory over the twelfth and thirteenth 
centuries was accompanied by a parallel development in defining the role of the Church in 
the realm of warfare. Issues such as clerical participation in war, the relationship between just 
war and holy war, and the definition of the crusade as an institution were examined and 
developed by Western canonists and theologians over the course of the twelfth and thirteenth 
centuries. 
The twelfth century Decretists took a keen interest in attempting to define the role of 
the Church in medieval western warfare. Although in many aspects related to warfare, the 
Decretists struggled to achieve a consensus, at least on the subject of the participation of 
clerics in warfare there was unanimous agreement. The Decretists agreed that all clerics were 
to be prohibited from physically taking part in warfare.
504
 This did not necessarily rule out all 
instances of armed violence however. According to Rufinus, it would be possible to take up 
arms to defend themselves under urgent necessity against pagans, on the order of a superior 
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authority.
505
 Rolando Bandinelli and Stephen of Tournai distinguished between major and 
minor orders of clerics. While clerics from a major order were absolutely prohibited from any 
fighting, Rolando argued that clerics from minor orders could even return to secular pursuits 
such as soldiery, a proposition that led Rufinus to question the sobriety of his fellow 
canonist.
506
 While it was almost never considered licit for clerics to actually fight in a war, 
under certain circumstances they could have an involvement in warfare. In the instance of 
prelates possessing temporal jurisdiction who were obligated to take part in war, they could 
perform their functions within certain parameters.
507
 While not allowed to physically fight, 
they could perform functions such as comfort, counsel and prayer for soldiers under their 
authority.
508
 Similarly, clerics involved in a holy war against infidels could arm and armour 
themselves for the purpose of self-preservation.
509
 Although their purpose was to encourage 
their soldiers and terrify the enemy, they were nonetheless prohibited from the shedding of 
blood.
510
 
The advent of the crusades at the end of the eleventh century had provided the 
Decretists with something of a problem to solve – the justification of Christian holy war. On 
this issue, the Decretists were again divided on what actually constituted a holy war. While 
there was no dispute over the authority of the Church to call for a crusade, division existed 
over whether the pope alone or bishops could call for a holy war, and what exactly justified a 
holy war against infidels or heretics.
511
 Was warfare justified against infidels merely for their 
unbelief, or did it require a specific trespass against Christians for war to be declared?
512
 Of 
all the Decretists, perhaps the most comprehensive and insightful scholar in this matter was 
Huguccio. The basis of Huguccio’s position on holy war, as with most of the Decretists, 
comes from the example of Israel in the Old Testament.
513
 While in their wars against the 
Canaanites, the Israelites took their authority directly from God, Christians should now take 
the pope as the ultimate authority for warfare.
514
 As Christ had since his resurrection been 
given dominion over the whole world, the pope, as the vicar of Christ, therefore possessed the 
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authority to declare war that God had wielded in the Old Testament.
515
 In deciding whether 
the Saracens deserved having war waged against them, Huguccio laid two charges against 
them. The lesser charge, that of disbelief, was not necessarily worth declaring war over, as 
Huguccio asserted that infidels were entitled to some limited rights such as property.
516
 The 
far greater charge was the usurpation of Christian lands by the Saracens, in particular the 
Holy Land. Because of the particular importance of the Holy Land to Christianity, Huguccio 
argued that the scope of any crusade would be limited to the Holy Land itself.
517
 By placing 
the authority for war within the office of the church, and providing just cause for the war 
against the Saracens, Huguccio and the Decretists brought the holy war within the definition 
of the just war. 
The primary contribution of the Decretalists to the role of the church in warfare, was 
the further elaboration of the theory of the crusade. In relation to the participation of clerics in 
warfare, the Decretalists did not add anything original, but looked to consolidate the views of 
the Decretists. By the thirteenth century however, there still remained a dispute over the just 
cause for holy war against infidels. In the case of the Saracens, both Raymond of Penafort 
and William of Rennes were willing to tolerate Muslim control of their own territories, but 
not those which had been formerly under Christian control (which formed a large proportion 
of Muslim territory).
518
 The key contributor to forming a consensus on this issue, and others 
relating to the crusades, was Pope Innocent IV. 
In his treatment of the crusades, Innocent set the parameters for both just cause and 
legitimate authority for the declaration of a crusade. On the question of authority, Innocent 
argues that the pope is the supreme authority to declare a crusade.
519
 This authority is based 
on the pope’s position as the Vicar of Christ. Because Christ has dominion over all, the pope 
therefore has dominion over infidels as well as Christians.
520
 Furthermore, only the pope has 
the authority to grant an indulgence to those who set out on crusade.
521
 As to the question of 
whether infidels merit a war to be waged against them, Innocent takes a measured approach. 
Innocent argues that God is the source of all earthly dominions, possessions and jurisdictions, 
and that he intended their use for all rational creatures, not just those who are Christians. 
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Therefore, infidels have a right to dominion over land which cannot be taken away from them 
solely because of unbelief.
522
 That being said, because the pope has dominion over the whole 
world, infidels must respect natural laws and should admit preachers into the lands within 
their jurisdiction. While the pope should only make war against the infidels under extreme 
necessity, he and he alone has the jurisdiction to declare war against them on behalf of 
Christendom.
523
 However, while the infidel may legitimately lay claim to dominions that 
were former Christian lands, the Holy Land is considered distinct. Although the Saracens 
own it, they own it illegally because it was consecrated by the birth, life and death of Christ, 
and is therefore sacred to Christianity.
524
 Furthermore, as the Holy Land was conquered in a 
just war by the Romans after the death of Christ, it is part of the Roman Empire, the rightful 
inheritance of the Church of Rome. In this manner, Innocent defined the crusade as a just 
war, fought for the liberation of the Holy Land, under the special jurisdiction of the pope who 
had the dispensation to grant indulgences. 
The key contribution of the canonists in this matter was to bring the concept of holy 
war within the definitions and boundaries of the just war. By identifying the pope as the 
source of legitimate authority for holy war, and defining what formed a legitimate cause for 
war against the infidels, holy war could be seen to fill all of the criteria of the just war.  
 
The Just War According to Thomas Aquinas 
 
The re-introduction of Aristotelian ideas into the mainstream of medieval European 
thought would have a profound effect on the fields of theology and philosophy, and upon the 
theory of just war. Between 1150 and 1250, there was a major influx of new translations of 
Greek texts into Western Europe.
525
 By the mid-thirteenth century, virtually the entirety of 
Greek science and philosophy was accessible to European scholars.
526
 The impact these texts 
had on Western theology was significant. In a comparison between Peter Lombard’s 
Sentences, written in the mid-twelfth century, and Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae 
written a hundred years later, R.W. Southern notes that while the former had only three 
quotations from secular philosophy, the latter had roughly 3,500 quotations from Aristotle 
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alone.
527
 Coinciding with the re-introduction of Greek ideas, particularly from Aristotle, was 
the development of a changing theological and philosophical framework within medieval 
Europe. In the self-perception of mankind, there was a form of Humanism developing, 
whereby humanity was seen in a far more positive light than had been the case in previous 
centuries.
528
 In the political and legal spheres, there was a change from a fundamentally 
supernatural view of society to a more natural one. Conceptions of government were 
beginning to move away from a feudal system bound up in ritual, to the conception of the 
community as the source of a ruler’s power.529 Understanding of the legal system began to be 
seen more in terms of rights and judgement by peers, rather than appeals to the supernatural 
as exemplified by the trial by ordeal.
530
 When applied to the realm of warfare, these trends in 
Western society would also affect the interpretation of the just war. 
The impact of Aristotelian philosophy on Thomas Aquinas is difficult to overestimate. 
While Aquinas’s acceptance of Aristotelian ideas was tempered by his Christianity, much of 
his philosophy was modelled on that of Aristotle. Aquinas’ knowledge of Aristotle was 
extensive, he wrote commentaries on a number of Aristotle’s works, including De Anima, 
Nicomachean Ethics, Metaphysics, and Politics.
531
 Indeed, the Summa Theologiae, Aquinas’s 
most extensive work, and the source of most of his writings on just war, was modelled 
predominately on the Nicomachean Ethics itself.
532
 The Nicomachean Ethics was written as a 
portrayal of the good life through the exploration of Aristotle’s virtues. Happiness was 
defined as the activity of the soul acting in accordance with virtue. Aquinas took Aristotle’s 
model and applied it within a Christian framework, using Aristotle’s concept of the Golden 
Mean to establish the most important Christian virtues. Aquinas then concluded from this that 
perfect happiness can only be found in the contemplation of God, and only then realised fully 
in the resurrection body.
533
 Aquinas’ reconciliation of Aristotelian and Christian concepts, as 
seen throughout the Summa, would have a significant effect on his understanding of warfare. 
In his treatment of just war, Aquinas drew on two major concepts from two different 
authors: Aristotle and the concept of the common good, and Augustine’s notion of the inward 
disposition informing the external action. In following Augustine’s justification of war, 
Aquinas was much the same as Gratian, the Decretists and the Decretalists. This 
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understanding can be seen in Aquinas’s discussion of self defence in the Summa. Moral acts 
are defined by intention, not from what is beside the intention.
534
 Where Aquinas 
distinguishes himself from his canonistic and theological predecessors, however, is in his 
adoption of Aristotle’s concept of the common good. This concept is rooted in the notion that 
at heart, man is a social and political animal.
535
 Because of this, it is natural that man lives in 
fellowship with others and provides for each the necessities they would otherwise lack, living 
in solitude.
536
 Arising from this situation, it is then necessary to appoint leaders to govern the 
community to ensure the integrity of the community and the common benefit to all.
537
 Just 
governments will serve their citizens and secure the common good, while unjust governments 
are directed towards the private good of the ruler.
538
 Furthermore, the establishment of law is 
directed towards the maintenance of the common good of the state.
539
 Aquinas uses this 
concept in his discussion in the Summa of whether it is lawful to kill sinners. Aquinas 
compares the actions of the sinner within the community to a disease or corruption within a 
body.
540
 Just as a physician would remove some member from a body if he deemed it likely 
to cause more damage or corruption, so would it be praiseworthy for a community to kill a 
sinner if he was considered to pose a significant danger to the health of the community.
541
 In 
his treatment of warfare, this form of argument would prove to be highly influential for 
Aquinas. 
Aquinas’s formulation of the just war consists of three components. Firstly, the 
authority of the prince by whose command the war is being waged.
542
 Second, a just cause is 
required.
543
 Thirdly, it is required that those who wage war should have a righteous intent.
544
 
Compared to canonists like Hostiensis or theologians such as Alexander of Hales, Aquinas’ 
formulation is fairly simple. The simplicity of Aquinas’s formulation brought it back in line 
with Augustine’s original definition. As F.H. Russell pointed out, “shorn of its medieval 
accretions, the formula could then apply to societies other than Christian and beyond his own 
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time.”545 Because of this, Aquinas’ formulation of just war quickly gained acceptance with 
contemporaries and remains influential even today. 
 Aquinas’ first just war criteria, that of authority, is based heavily on the concept of 
the common good. Authority to wage war is vested solely in the prince, since the care of the 
commonwealth is entrusted to him.
546
 This definition of ‘prince’ is fairly broad, and is 
applied in this context either to a city, kingdom or province.
547
 Quoting the Apostle Paul, 
Aquinas judges it lawful for princes to use the sword to protect the commonwealth against 
external enemies, in the same manner as it is expected of them to deal with enemies within 
the commonwealth.
548
 This authority is exclusive to the prince however. No private citizen 
has the authority to declare war on either his own behalf, or that of others. A private citizen 
cannot declare war on his own behalf, because he already has recourse to legal justice.
549
 
Neither can a private citizen declare war on behalf of the commonwealth, on account of the 
fact that he has not been entrusted with its protection.
550
 On the issue of authority, Aquinas 
essentially reaches the same conclusions as his Decretist and Decretalist predecessors, but his 
method differs considerably. Where the Decretalist formulation of authority was heavily 
influenced by medieval feudal political structures, Aquinas’ Aristotelian framework provides 
far more flexibility for application in different contexts.  
On the matter of just cause, Aquinas essentially adopts Augustine’s position without 
adding anything new to it. According to Augustine: ‘A just war is customarily defined as one 
which avenges injuries, as when a nation or state deserves to be punished because it has 
neglected either to put right the wrongs done by its people or to restore what it has unjustly 
seized.’551 From this, Aquinas couches the issue of just cause very much within a moral 
framework. Those against whom war is waged must deserve having war waged against them.  
For the third criteria, righteous intent, Aquinas borrows from both Augustine and 
Aristotle. Aquinas defines righteous intent as either an intention to promote a good cause or 
avert an evil.
552
 Following the example of Augustine, Aquinas looks to the inward disposition 
to decide whether a war can be considered just. Wars ultimately have to be fought out of a 
desire for peace and to the end of coercing the wicked and helping the good. ‘The desire to do 
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harm, the cruelty of vengeance, an unpeaceable and implacable spirit, the fever of rebellion, 
the lust to dominate’ are all motives to be condemned, and can render unlawful a war which 
has already been declared by a legitimate authority for a just cause.
553
 Yet even within this 
very Augustinian interpretation of righteous intent, there remains present a hint of 
Aristotelian sentiment. In his defence of the biblical objections to violence: ‘But I say unto 
you, that ye resist not evil’, and: ’Dearly beloved, avenge not yourselves, but give place unto 
wrath’, Aquinas agrees that one should always be prepared to not resist or defend himself if 
necessary.
554
 However, the for the benefit of the common good, and even for the good of 
those you are fighting, war provides a necessary alternative.
555
 
On the role of church in warfare, Aquinas consolidated much of the thought of the 
Decretists and Decretalists. Like them, Aquinas prohibited all within the clergy from the 
shedding of blood in war. His reasoning however, was again partially attributable to Aristotle 
and the notion of the common good. Starting from Christ’s command to Peter to ‘Put up thy 
sword into the scabbard’, Aquinas argued that the act of warfare was not a task befitting 
bishops or clerics.
556
 This prohibition was not put in place because fighting is a sin, but 
because it was not in keeping with their duty.
557
 Because clerics are devoted to works even 
more meritorious than just war, their participation would be rendered sinful, relative to their 
greater obligations.
558
 In his argument, Aquinas specified two particular reasons. Firstly, that 
warlike tasks disquiet the mind and prevent clerics from performing their duties properly, 
such as the offering of prayers for the people. Secondly, as those who are ordained to 
administer the sacraments, clerics should emulate Christ in being prepared to pour out their 
own blood, rather than shed that of others.
559
 However, while they could not shed blood, 
clerics could still participate in war within certain parameters. Following the lead of the 
canonists, Aquinas allowed clerics to participate on a spiritual level, through the use of prayer 
and admonitions, and the offering of spiritual assistance to those who fight justly.
560
  
In relation to the issue of holy war, Aquinas did not attempt any systematic discussion 
of the topic, or relate the theory of crusade to that of the just war. When he did refer to the 
nature of relations with unbelievers in the Summa however, Aquinas tended to follow the 
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example of Innocent IV. Unbelievers who had never received the faith were not to be coerced 
into it, and should only be fought in the event that they ‘hinder the faith by blasphemies or 
evil persuasions, or, indeed, by open persecutions.’561 Unbelief by those outside of 
Christendom’s jurisdiction was not in itself a just cause for war against them, but could only 
be brought about if injustices were being done to Christians. The lack of attention paid by 
Aquinas to the crusades, and holy war in general, may perhaps be indicative of the reduced 
success of the crusading movement in the latter part of the thirteenth century.   
On the matter of conduct in war, Aquinas focussed on two different issues in the 
Summa: the use of ambushes in war and the legality of fighting on holy days. On the use of 
ambushes in warfare, Aquinas first put forward the objection that ambushes, as a kind of 
deception, were unlawful to use even in a just war.
562
 To counter this objection, Aquinas cited 
the authority of Augustine, who permitted the use of ambushes, and the example of Joshua 
against the city of Ai.
563
 Aquinas then distinguished between two forms of deception. 
Deception through the breaking of a promise or the telling of false information was 
considered to always be unlawful, even in warfare. However, deception through the 
withholding of thoughts or intentions could be considered lawful in a war against the enemy, 
as Christians are not always bound to reveal to others anything that they know.
564
 In the case 
of fighting on holy days, Aquinas cites the example of Christ and also the notion of the 
common good. Aquinas reasons that just as physicians are allowed to treat people on holy 
days on the authority of John 7:23: ‘Are ye angry at me because I have made a man every 
whit whole on the Sabbath-day?’, it is much more important to preserve the health of the 
commonwealth through the prevention of slaughter.
565
 As far as it is considered necessary, it 
can be considered lawful to wage just war on holy days in order to defend the commonwealth 
of the faithful.
566
 
Aquinas’ treatment of the just war marked a turning point in the development of the 
theory. More than any other medieval scholar, Aquinas’ formulation of the just war would 
continue to influence successive generations of just war theorists right up until the present 
day. In terms of his conclusions, Aquinas was not much different from the other theologians 
or canonists of his day. What distinguished Aquinas was the manner in which he reached his 
conclusions. While Augustine remained a heavy influence, it was his introduction of 
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Aristotelian concepts that set Aquinas apart from his medieval predecessors. Aquinas’ 
synthesis of Christianity and Aristotle laid the foundation for a more recognisably ‘modern’ 
conception of warfare, based around the institution of the state.   
The development of just war theory in the later medieval period owed a massive debt 
to Gratian’s transmission of Augustine’s writings in the Decretum. First of all, the act of 
bringing together effectively all of the Western Church’s writings on the subject provided a 
foundation for development which had not previously existed. Secondly, by deferring to the 
judgement of Augustine throughout Causa 23 of the Decretum, Gratian provided the basis for 
further elaboration of the just war through his conclusion that warfare could indeed be fought 
without sin. Having first accepted this proposition, the Decretists, Decretalists and 
theologians of medieval Europe were then free to speculate on the limits of just war and its 
precise definitions. As the formulation and definitions of just war theory became more 
complex, the related concept of holy war was also brought within the definition of just war. 
In the Byzantine East however, there were no real intellectual efforts to establish a theory of 
just war. Despite the presence of some twelfth-century challenges to established Church 
doctrine, the Eastern Church’s negative attitude towards warfare was never seriously 
questioned. Without being able to first establish that warfare could be pursued without sin, 
any effort towards developing a concept of just war in the Eastern Church were stillborn. 
Finally, the contribution of Thomas Aquinas represented the apex of just war theory in the 
Middle Ages. His formulation of the concept was quickly adopted throughout medieval 
Europe and remains the most influential of any of the medieval scholars. However, Aquinas’ 
incorporation of Aristotelian ideas within his treatment of just war, pointed towards a new 
understanding of the theory. Aquinas’ understanding of warfare in service of the common 
good, pointed more towards the modern conception of the state and the standing army, than it 
did towards the old feudal hierarchy of medieval Europe.  
 
Just War theory in Medieval Byzantium 
 
Unlike the Christian West, the Byzantine East never formulated a theory of just war 
comparable to that developed by Rufinus, Hostiensis or Thomas Aquinas. In the case of the 
Decretists, Decretalists, and medieval theologians, the issue of whether war could be pursued 
without sin was almost undisputed. The Augustinian arguments put forward in the Decretum 
had essentially closed the debate on the subject in the West, and from that point on Western 
scholars sought to define the parameters of the just war. However, in the Christian East, there 
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had remained a consistently negative attitude towards the issue of warfare. Based primarily 
on the writings of St Basil, the act of killing in warfare was considered sinful, regardless of 
motive. Without first establishing the proposition that hypothetically, war could be fought 
without sin, there could be no formulation or elaboration of a just war theory.  
In the twelfth century however, there was an attempt by two Byzantine canonists to 
readdress the relationship between sin and warfare. In reference to St Basil’s command 
prohibiting soldiers with unclean hands from communion for three years, John Zonaras and 
Theodore Balsamon both argued against its enforcement.
567
  Citing Athanasius’ approval of 
warfare in his Letter to Amun, they argue that soldiers are not deserving of the prohibition on 
communion, ‘which is an unendurable punishment for Christians.’568  Zonaras and Balsamon 
stress the virtues possessed by the soldier, as well as their good intentions. Why should 
Christians who fight bravely for the defence of chastity and piety be punished for their deeds? 
Furthermore, they make the point that if it was not for the soldier’s willingness to come to 
blows with his opponents, Christians everywhere would fall under barbarian rule.
569
 
This attitude to warfare did not however, have any real impact on Byzantine theology 
or lead to a new consideration of just war. Indeed, these arguments were roundly rejected by 
the fourteenth-century Byzantine canonist, Matthew Blastares. In his case, Blastares makes 
use of both theological and philosophical arguments.   
In his philosophical argument, Blastares refers to the relationship of evil with the 
presence of passions in human nature.
570
 Man is exposed to two types of passions: ‘those 
united to nature and necessity and those supported by nature and deliberate choice’.571 The 
first type is considered natural, and free from indictment as no element of choice is present. 
The second type of passion however, which warfare falls within, is voluntary and thus man is 
responsible for it.
572
 By choosing to ‘dip their right hands in the blood of the enemy’, soldiers 
then require penance to purify them through the medicines of repentance.
573
 
Blastares’ theological argument comes predominately from the example of Moses in 
the Old Testament. While Israel’s holy wars were divinely ordered, the soldiers who took part 
in the killing were required to remain outside the camp for a week to purify themselves.
574
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Similarly, God refused to allow King David to construct a temple on account of his ‘right 
hand having incurred pollution by the immense murder of enemies’.575 Drawing a parallel 
between Israel and the Byzantine Empire, Blastares justifies the necessity of soldiers being 
purified before being admitted into communion. 
In addition to the internal debate within the Byzantine Empire, the external context 
may have contributed to the lack of development with regard to just war. While the schism of 
1054 had had an adverse effect on Latin-Greek relations, there remained some degree of 
tolerance and goodwill between the two Churches. There was an active dialogue between the 
churches during the twelfth century, and neither Church generally considered the other to be 
heretical.
576
 However, this situation would radically change following the Fourth Crusade in 
1204. 
The Fourth Crusade, originally intended for the Holy Land via Egypt, ended with the 
sack of Constantinople by the crusading armies of Europe. With the capital of the Byzantine 
Empire conquered, a Latin kingdom was set up in its place. Weak and heavily reliant on the 
West for support, the Empire of Romania met its end in 1261 when it was recaptured by 
Byzantine forces.
577
 The lasting legacy of the Fourth Crusade and the kingdom it spawned, 
was severe damage to relations between Western Europe and the Byzantine Empire, and 
between the two Churches. The Latin occupation of Constantinople, and its attempts to 
impose its own ecclesiastical hierarchy over that of the Orthodox Church, only served to 
embitter Greek against Latin.
578
 Any chance of reconciliation all but disappeared after that 
point. This hostile attitude towards the West also permeated into the field of theology, and 
may perhaps have affected attitudes toward a theory such as just war. For example, Matthew 
Blastares, as well as arguing against any consideration of a just war theory, was also ardent in 
his opposition to Church reconciliation.  
In addition to the damage it caused to relations between the Latin and Greek 
Churches, the Fourth Crusade would also contribute to the eventual downfall of the 
Byzantine Empire itself. Although already weak in 1204, as shown by its capture by the 
crusading army, the establishment of the short-lived Latin Empire almost certainly hastened 
Byzantium’s eventual demise. The loss of Constantinople as the capital for almost sixty years 
severely weakened the empire. Even after the re-capture of the capital in 1261, Greeks had 
begun to identify themselves more through their common religion than their citizenship in the 
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Byzantine Empire.
579
 As Western Europe grew stronger, both politically and intellectually 
throughout the medieval period, the opposite occurred in Byzantium, its empire eventually 
succumbing to the Ottoman Turks in 1453. Subjugated under Muslim rule, any future 
discussion of matters such as just war would be of a purely academic nature for theologians 
in the Ottoman Empire. 
The development of a just war theory in the East was a difficult proposition, due to its 
lack of compatibility with Christian Greek theology. Although at times the question was 
raised, there was never really any serious theological opposition to Basil’s decree that warfare 
could not be pursued without sin. Without first establishing that proposition, there could be 
no serious development of a just war theory within the Christian East. Furthermore, due to 
the breakdown in relations between the Latin and Greek Churches following the Fourth 
Crusade in 1204, there was less possibility for agreement between the Churches on matters of 
doctrine. The just war, let alone a holy war, was never realised within the Byzantine Empire.   
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Conclusion 
 
The prevailing attitudes towards warfare in Eastern and Western Christendom during 
the medieval period, ultimately found their basis in theology. Beginning in the fourth century, 
two theologians would set the tone for each of their respective Church’s positions on warfare 
throughout the remainder of the Middle Ages. In the West, St Augustine introduced the 
concept of the Christian just war. This concept would continue to be refined and developed 
right throughout the medieval period, and would result in the establishment of the Catholic 
Church’s doctrines of just war and crusade. In the East however, St Basil came to the 
conclusion that warfare could not be truly just, but was rather a necessary evil. Throughout 
the history of the Byzantine Empire, St Basil’s position remained normative, despite a 
number of attempts to revise the position.  
The separation of the Roman Empire into two political spheres in the fourth century 
foreshadowed a cultural divergence that would only continue to grow over time. Some of the 
reasons for the drifting apart of East and West were due to external factors, namely invasion 
from outside and all the social and economic upheavals that are associated with it. However, 
the most important factor affecting the ideological outlook of East and West was that of 
language. In the West, Latin became the language of the Church and of government. In the 
East, Greek remained the common language in the Byzantine Empire and even replaced Latin 
as the language of government. The peculiarities of the two languages would have a 
significant effect on the way the theologians of East and West interpreted scripture. Precise 
and structured, Latin lent itself well to abstraction and the formation of legal doctrine. 
Alternately, the nature of Greek allowed for intricate philosophical speculation, but not 
necessarily many settled formal doctrines. Coupled with a relative lack of interaction between 
Greek East and Latin West after the fifth century, Greek and Latin theologians would 
interpret scripture and develop their theologies within two distinct interpretive frameworks.  
The key theological issue which separated East from West with regards to warfare 
was the understanding of sin. In Western theology, sin has been primarily understood within 
a legal framework, through the doctrine of atonement.  In a general sense, atonement 
describes the process by which Christians are justified before God, through the death of Jesus 
Christ on the cross. As sinners, all humanity has transgressed God’s law and therefore stands 
legally guilty and deserving of punishment. However, through the person of Jesus Christ, 
God took the penalty of humanity’s sin upon Himself in order that humanity may be legally 
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justified before God. Because of this legal framework, the subject of warfare provides a 
major ethical dilemma in Western theology. How can a Christian society carry out warfare in 
a manner which can be consistent with God’s law? In contrast, the Eastern understanding of 
sin does not emphasise this legal framework. Instead, the Eastern view of sin is understood in 
light of the concept of theosis – the process by which believers are transformed by the Spirit 
into the likeness of God. Within this context, sin is seen as a frustration of this process, which 
can occur either through a wilful turning away from God, but also out of necessity. This latter 
concept can be described as ‘involuntary sin’, which can include actions which are damaging 
to the soul, despite being done out of necessity and without wrongful intent. Because of this 
theological distinction, there is within Eastern Christianity simply less incentive to justify an 
issue such as Christian warfare. These foundational theological presuppositions can be 
identified in the writings of both St Augustine and St Basil, and indeed in theologians of 
warfare that followed throughout the medieval period.  
In the West, St Augustine would provide the foundation for the medieval conception 
of the just war. All of the key principles of Christian just war can be found within 
Augustine’s writings. Augustine re-interpreted the traditional Roman understanding of just 
war within a Christian framework. War, although often reprehensible and responsible for 
much suffering, is not necessarily considered sinful. According to Augustine, if carried out 
with the proper authority, intention, and inward disposition of the heart, it is possible for a 
Christian to shed blood in warfare without falling into sin. What mattered was not the 
physical action, but whether the agent was acting out of love (of God and neighbour) or 
selfish motivation.  
In the centuries after the fall of Rome and the collapse of the Western Roman Empire, 
Augustine’s just war theory was not developed to any significant degree. In fact, the scholarly 
understanding of just war often reverted to the old Roman understanding of the concept, as 
illustrated by Isidore of Seville in the sixth century. As basic as it may have been however, 
during the early medieval period there was an implicit understanding that there was a division 
between ‘just’ and ‘unjust’ wars. During the formation of the councils of the ‘Peace of God’ 
and ‘Truce of God’, while the aim was to limit the effects of warfare on the innocent, warfare 
was not condemned in and of itself as an evil. Rather, the crime was that the sword was being 
misused against those who did not deserve it. Likewise, the development of the papal holy 
war which led to the First Crusade in 1095 shows that within the Church, war could be seen 
as a positive good as well as a negative. As early as the ninth century, popes were granting 
assurances to soldiers fighting against Muslim infidels that their military sacrifice would 
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ensure them of their salvation (provided of course their intent was righteous). The First 
Crusade itself, launched before any systematic formulation of just war doctrine had been 
established, was defended by theologians first and foremost as a justifiable war.  
Following the systematic organisation of Church doctrine that occurred in the twelfth 
century, and in particular the appearance of Gratian’s Decretum, Augustine’s thought on just 
war became more accessible to a wide range of canon lawyers and theologians. This 
facilitated a period of development whereby the principles that Augustine established for the 
just war began to be systematically formulated into a number of doctrines and theories. In 
addition to this, doctrines defending the crusades and Christian holy war in general were 
developed within the wider just war tradition. For all their development however, until the 
arrival of Thomas Aquinas and his re-introduction of Aristotelian concepts into the just war 
theory, medieval just war theory remained well and truly based in the thought of St 
Augustine.  
The relationship between Eastern Christianity and warfare would however follow a 
very different path. Although nowhere near as prolific as St Augustine in his writings on 
warfare, St Basil’s treatment of the issue would set the standard for discussion on the subject. 
Unlike Augustine, Basil ruled out the notion that war could be considered just or even 
morally neutral. While upholding the right of Christians to defend themselves militarily 
against those who would seek to destroy or subdue them, Basil nonetheless decreed that even 
if borne out of necessity, war remained an objective evil. Viewed through the theological lens 
of theosis, the shedding of human blood through warfare (or by any other means) was an 
action which was intrinsically damaging to the agent, regardless of whether or not the action 
was carried out with righteous intent. By holding this attitude towards warfare, Basil was 
never able to either endorse just war or holy war as principles.  
The basic principle that St Basil adhered to in his attitude towards warfare, that it was 
a necessary evil, ensured that just war would remain a stillborn concept within the Byzantine 
Empire. Throughout the history of the Byzantine Empire, there is strong evidence that this 
view remained normative. Various Byzantine military manuals, such as those written by the 
Emperors Maurice and Leo VI, display recognition of war as a necessary evil, and in their 
recommended tactics reveal a desire to avoid combat when possible. When confronted with 
the holy wars of Islam and Latin Christianity, Byzantine scholars consistently reject the 
concept. And when Basil’s pronouncements themselves came under attack from those within 
the Byzantine Empire, even from the emperor himself, the authority of Basil was consistently 
upheld by Byzantine Churchmen. Through to the fall of Byzantium in 1453, this inherently 
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negative attitude towards warfare prohibited any internal development of an Eastern 
conception of just war, and also prevented its adoption from either the Latin West or the 
Islamic East.  
What this thesis has sought to address is the lack of scholarly attention paid to the 
Eastern Church’s attitude towards warfare in comparison to the Latin West. In particular, it 
asks and answers the question of why just war theory developed in the Latin Church but was 
consistently rejected in the East. The primary cause of this divergence between East and West 
is theological. The Greek Church’s theological framework, interpreted through the lens of 
theosis, made the concept of just war fundamentally inconsistent with the mindset of Eastern 
Christianity. In the West, the ethical dilemma that warfare posed to a Christian society 
demanded questions that had to be answered.  In the East, the theological framework did not 
raise the same issues, as warfare could not be justified as a righteous act. The stasis of 
Eastern thought on the subject, compared to the increasingly complex formulation of just war 
concepts in the West, bears witness to this fact. In addition to answering this question, this 
thesis has also attempted to highlight the influence of language in shaping the divergent paths 
of Eastern and Western Christianity. The subject of warfare in this instance is in many ways 
indicative of a wider theme. Although they were members of the same empire, shared the 
same religion, and shared essentially the same philosophical and intellectual inheritance, the 
Churches of Rome and Constantinople developed along very different paths. The issue of 
Christian warfare is but one example of how East and West interpreted theology in a very 
distinctive way. The effect of language on culture, and in this context theology, is a 
significant one indeed, and can be equally as important as any single economic or political 
factor.  
The issue of just war and the differing approaches taken towards it in the Latin West 
and Greek East is just a small part of a much larger area of research which has not received 
sufficient scholarly attention to date. Ever since Edward Gibbon’s negative depiction of the 
Byzantine Empire and the legacy that it provided in The Decline and Fall of the Roman 
Empire, the history of Byzantium and the Christian East has not received much attention 
from Western scholars, relative to the study of Western Europe.
580
 Those who do study 
Byzantine history, usually do so without any comparative reference to the West. There is 
however a good case for more comparative research of the two halves of Christendom. Both 
share the cultural and religious inheritance of Rome, and their similarities outweigh their 
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differences. By further examining the issues that divided and united East and West, we can 
better understand the elements that have made our own Western civilisation distinct.  
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